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BROKEN PROMISE: THE DEMISE OF “SURE AND CERTAIN
RELIEF” UNDER THE NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS’
COMPENSATION ACT
DEAN J. HAAS*

ABSTRACT
The workers’ compensation bargain in which employees gave up the
ability to sue their employers in exchange for “sure and certain relief” is
premised on the economic theory that such voluntary agreement between
competing interests promotes efficiency in an unfettered market. The cost
of workers’ compensation, ostensibly borne by employers, is supposedly
priced into the cost of the product or service. This is said to “internalize”
the cost to industry, a bedrock economic principle necessary to ensure
efficient allocation of resources and employee safety. Yet, in North Dakota,
the bargain is broken. Employee safety has taken a backseat to saving
employers money. This is evident in nearly every aspect of workers’
compensation in North Dakota. Medical necessity determinations are
subject to resolution under a binding dispute resolution mechanism without
a right to a hearing. And once disability benefits have been terminated, a
mistaken decision by the North Dakota Supreme Court precludes
opportunity for reinstatement in a great number of cases. In addition, the
byzantine and restrictive Century Code, conservative rulings of the Court,
and the adversarial litigation posture of Workforce Safety and Insurance
have resulted in the near death of the claimants’ bar. Employees who have
lost their job and are denied workers compensation benefits are often unable
to afford to hire an attorney. Further, Workforce Safety’s vigorous defense
strategy includes excessive reliance on out-of-state Independent Medical
Examinations.
And the Agency’s consistent lobbying against any
legislation that improves benefits or merely levels the playing field
highlights the degree to which North Dakota has broken its promise of
relief to injured employees. Unfortunately, a remedy does not appear
anywhere on the horizon. Employees attracted to North Dakota find that if
they are unfortunate enough to suffer a work injury here, their financial
health is as devastated as their physical being. Admittedly, not all physical
injuries can be prevented. But human virtue requires North Dakota live up
to its promise of “sure and certain” relief.
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INTRODUCTION

North Dakota is enjoying national attention from the oil boom. But our
great state is not just blessed with oil and gas and good agricultural land,
but also with an industrious, hard-working, and dedicated people. North
Dakota has lured workers from every part of the country; they come to earn
good wages, and they make a valuable contribution to our state’s economy.
Many of these new jobs are hard labor and carry with them risk of injury. It
is increasingly common for an individual hurt at work to return to his or her
home state if disability persists. They carry with them stories of pauperism
resulting from an injury inadequately compensated by North Dakota
Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”). As never before, our state’s
workers compensation system is front and center. Unfortunately, this
highlights the failure to live up to the high standard set by the authors of the
Act in 1919—the grand pronouncement that “the prosperity of the state
depends in a large measure upon the well-being of its wageworkers, and,
hence, for workers injured in hazardous employments, and for their families
and dependents, sure and certain relief is hereby provided regardless of
questions of fault . . . .”1

* Dean J. Haas received his J.D. (with distinction) from the University of North Dakota in 1983
and an LL.M. in Health Law (honors) from the University of Houston in 2001. Haas was counsel
to the North Dakota Workers’ Compensation Fund from 1983-1995 and has represented hundreds
of injured workers since. Haas is currently practicing law at Larson Latham Huettl in Bismarck.
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (2013).
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In the last year for which statistics are available (2012), North Dakota
led the country with the highest fatality rate in the work-place (17.7 per
100,000 workers).2 At the other extreme, the state’s workers compensation
premiums are the least expensive.3 Moreover, WSI has rebated to
employers premiums amounting to $774.3 million since 2005.4 How do we
keep rates so low? This article argues that such extremities come from the
fact that North Dakota law contains many benefit limitations and outright
exclusions to coverage. Most of these limitations or exclusions are created
by statute, but some are rooted in decisions of the North Dakota Supreme
Court. The scope of coverage has been limited by the double-barreled
shotgun of a blinkered view of the necessary causal relationship between
work and injury and the adversarial litigation technique of trial by IME.
This article addresses a number of causation issues in part II, with closely
related “medical necessity” questions in part III. Part IV addresses disability
issues, while Part V closes with an overview of the adversarial litigation
posture of WSI.
II. CAUSATION ISSUES
A number of fault provisions now scar the “no-fault” landscape. The
North Dakota Worker’s Compensation Act bars compensation in
connection with a self-inflicted injury, including suicide or attempted
suicide;5 an injury caused by the use of intoxicants;6 an injury that arises out
of an altercation in which the employee is the aggressor;7 and an injury that
2. Death on the Job Report, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Job-Safety/Death-onthe-Job-Report.
3. The country’s 2012 median value is $1.88 per $100 of payroll, and premium rate indices
range from a low of $1.01 in North Dakota to a high of $3.01 in Alaska. See OREGON DEP’T OF
CONSUMER AND BUS. SERVS., 2012 OREGON WORKERS COMPENSATION PREMIUM RATE
RANKING SUMMARY (2012).
4. In June, 2013, WSI announced it would send employers almost $160 million in payments
as a distribution of surplus reserves, the latest in a series of eight employer rebates since 2005
totaling nearly three quarters of a billion dollars. See Forum News Service, N.D. employers to get
rebate,
BAKKEN
TODAY,
June
22,
2012,
http://www.bakkentoday.com/event/article/id/189332/publisher_ID/10/
5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(2) (2013). The burden of proof, however, is on WSI
to establish willful self-injury. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-11 (2013).
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(3) (2013). The burden of proving injury due to use
of alcohol or a controlled substance is on WSI, but drug testing that establishes a concentration
level at a specified amount creates a presumption that “the injury was due to [drug] impairment.”
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-11 (2013).
7. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(4) (2013). The North Dakota Supreme Court has
not discussed the meaning of “aggressor” under North Dakota Century Code title 65, but has in
the context of Job Service disqualification for misconduct. See ProServe Corp. v. Rainey, 536
N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1995). Professor Larson suggests that “words alone, however inflammatory,
are not such aggression as to deprive claimant of compensation.” 1 LEX K. LARSON, WORKERS
COMPENSATION LAW § 8.01[5][c] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.).
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arises out of an “illegal act committed by the injured employee.”8
Additionally, the Act bars compensation when an employee aggravates or
worsens his work injury in any activity “which exceed the treatment
recommendations of the employee’s doctor . . . .”9 Nonparticipation in
certain medical treatments10 and vocational requirements such as job
search11 also result in termination of benefits. These limitations generally
deal with some act or circumstance that is deemed sufficient to bar
compensation based on attenuation of cause between employment and
injury. Recently, the North Dakota Supreme Court has further restricted the
range of compensable injuries in deciding the meaning of the causal
component of the basic compensation test.
A. ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT
North Dakota’s definition of “compensable injury” is plain vanilla
standard in the industry, meaning “an injury by accident arising out of and
in the course of hazardous employment which must be established by
medical evidence supported by objective medical findings.”12 There has
been litigation over the meaning of “accident,”13 but the term is no longer
controversial. While some advocates believed that the added requirement
of “objective medical findings” might serve to deny compensation for soft
tissue injury and the like (injuries that are not verifiable with medical tests
such as EMG, x-ray, or MRI), fortunately the North Dakota Supreme Court
has held that “objective medical evidence” may “include a physician’s

8. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(5) (2013). Professor Larson states that “[t]he great
majority of cases involving simple traffic ordinances and statutes, such as speed or stop laws, have
failed to find willful misconduct on the strength of the violation.” Moreover, the violation must
have caused the accident to be a valid defense. 2 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 37.03.
9. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28(5) (2013). The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that
WSI “must prove the claimant knew of the specific work restrictions and intentionally engaged in
activities exceeding those restrictions before benefits can be denied based on aggravation of a
prior injury.” Holen v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 145, ¶ 13, 615 N.W.2d 141, 144.
10. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28(4) (2013). Professor Larson notes that the majority of
Courts hold that a claimant may not be required to invasive care, such as surgery, “because of the
graver danger of the procedure involved.” 2 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 10.10(3). WSI may also
“require the employee to begin treating with another doctor . . . .” N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-28
(2013).
11. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05.1-04(4), (6) (2013).
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10) (2013).
13. See Stout v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 236 N.W.2d 889, 894 (N.D. 1975)
(holding that the “by accident” requirement is satisfied if the cause is a sudden accident or a
repetitive injury due to the routine performance of the claimant’s duties).
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medical opinion based on an examination, a patient’s medical history, and
the physician’s education and experience.”14
“Course of” employment primarily refers to time and place of the
injury,15 as in employer-paid travel outside normal work hours. There is more
litigation concerning the meaning of “arising out of” employment, for this
refers to a causal connection between the work and the injury.16 The North
Dakota Supreme Court has recently narrowed the scope of injuries that can be
said to have a causal connection to employment.
In 1988, the WSI Fund did not require showing of an “increased risk” of
injury, but recognized the positional (neutral) risk doctrine, which affords
coverage due to an actual employment risk even if the general public is also
exposed to such risk—as in a tornado.17 In fact, many courts “no longer
stringently apply the separate elements of the compensation causation test
‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of’ employment, favoring a more general
causal nexus standard.”18 For the first time in Fetzer v. Workforce Safety
and Insurance,19 the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the positional
risk doctrine, which grounds awards for workplace injuries arising from a
“neutral” risk—that is, a risk neither directly associated with the
employment, nor personal to the employee.20 Rejecting the positional risk
theory under the premise that the injury could have just as well occurred at
home is to imagine a contrary history that did not occur—a notoriously barren
and fruitless exercise.21 While the Fetzer court declined to compensate an
employee who fell while walking down a hallway at work, rejection of the
positional risk doctrine applies with no less force to injuries that occur from
a random tornado or terrorist attack.22 Professor Larson notes that “[i]n
spite of the tremendous personal losses associated with the Oklahoma City

14. Myhre v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2002 ND 186, ¶ 15, 653 N.W.2d 705, 710
(quoting Engebretson v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 112, ¶ 24, 595 N.W.2d 312, 319
(Maring, J., concurring)).
15. Boyko v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 409 N.W.2d 638, 640 (N.D. 1987).
16. Choukalos v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 427 N.W.2d 344, 345-46 (N.D. 1988).
17. Clare Hochhalter & Dean J. Haas, An Introduction to N.D. Workers’ Compensation, 64
N.D. L. REV. 173, 194 n.155 (1988).
18. Dean J. Haas, Falling Down on the Job: Workers’ Compensation Shifts From a NoFault to a Worker Fault Paradigm, 79 N.D. L. REV. 203, 237 n.253 (2003).
19. 2012 ND 73, ¶ 13, 815 N.W.2d 539, 544.
20. 1 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 4.03.
21. Id. at § 7.03.
22. Professor Larson explains that unexplained falls are a positional risk case—just as
clearly as in the case in which a claimant is injured by a stray bullet, rabid dog, lunatic, lighting
strike, tornado, or in a terrorist attack. Id. at § 7.04[1][a]. Larson says “a lot of confusion,
circumlocutions, and fictions could be avoided in the unexplained-fall cases by merely accepting the
proposition that what is unexplained is neutral.” Id. at § 7.04[1][c] (emphasis added).
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bombing . . . [no case questions] the employers’ basic liability for workers’
compensation benefits.”23
Unfortunately, rejection of the positional risk doctrine requires a
claimant to prove an increased risk of injury, as in a fall: from a height, on
a slippery floor, over frayed carpet, due to loose shoes, or simply
attributable to a harried response to an emergency. The need for a unifying
legal principle is best illustrated where employees strain to explain an
increased risk of injury due to a fall from a height. The history of these
legions of cases shows that what begins as an understandable increased risk of
injury due to fall from a great height soon extends to consider falls from a few
feet and even to a few inches. Professor Larson observes bitingly:
“conclusions about the effects of falls, when one gets down to distinctions
based on inches, become factual matters of physics and physiology rather than
of legal principle.”24 There is no reason to extend this subjective and
unprincipled exercise to the neutral risk cases where it is not needed.25
It is precisely such “hard facts”—e.g., a terrorist bombing that targets
random Americans, not particular employees—that should have steeled the
court’s nerves to adopt Larson’s neutral risk test and avoid judicial
gerrymandering regarding the types of neutral risks that are compensated (e.g.,
terrorist attacks and tornados only). Adoption of the neutral risk test would
also negate the need to draw non-principled artificial distinctions regarding the
heights, obstacles, stresses or emergencies, articles of clothing, and more, that
pose an ‘increased risk’ of injury from falling.
Fetzer is also notable in that ambiguous legislative history was used to
justify deviating from the majority coverage rule espoused by Professor
Larson. In 1977, at the request of the agency, the Legislature adopted the
industry standard coverage formulation “arising out of and in the course of
employment” in response to a court decision that had required payment of
benefits to an employee injured in a fight at work that was rooted in
personal animosity.26 The case citing this change in the legislative history,
23. Id. at § 7.02[2].
24. Id. at § 9.01[4][d].
25. Larson notes that “[p]roving increased risk can be quite difficult,” discussing a decision in a
jurisdiction, Illinois, that does not accept the positional risk theory. Id. at § 7.02[4] (citing Brady v.
Louis Ruffalo & Sons Constr. Co., 578 N.E.2d 921 (Ill. 1991)). Larson concludes that the decision
may even bar compensation for a claimant seeking to recover “from a September 11-like attack . . . .”
Id. It seems clear that denying benefits for unexplained fall claimants may have unintended
consequences.
26. Fetzer v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2012 ND 73, ¶ 18, 815 N.W.2d 539, 542. The
statute was actually amended in 1977 to overturn a lower court decision allowing compensation
for an injury occurring to an employee as a result of a personally motivated fight. See Mitchell v.
Sanborn, 536 N.W.2d 678, 684 n.4 (1995). If an assault is personally motivated or a fall occurs due to
a personal risk of the employee, Larson says that it then makes sense to apply the principle that the
employment must contribute to the risk of injury. 1 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 9.01[4][b].
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Mitchell v. Sanborn,27 was a horseplay case. Notably, the North Dakota
Supreme Court, citing Professor Larson, recognized that modern workers’
compensation principles had evolved to place the risk of loss on the employer
unless the risk is distinctly personal.28 The horseplay cases show a remarkable
change from a rule disfavoring compensation to perpetrators, to a rule favoring
awards.29 Larson notes that the “arising” element is remarkably simple to
meet: “once it has been concluded that the horseplay activity was no
departure from employment,” the “the ‘arising’ test can be simply met by
the argument that if the activity itself qualifies as part of the employment,
and the harm arises out of that activity, then the harm arises out of the
employment of which that activity was a part.”30 The North Dakota
Supreme Court similarly stated that the compensation test is whether the
horseplay activity (horseplay is itself never a work duty) is nevertheless
somehow “commingled with his duties.”31
The Fetzer court did not answer the most basic of all questions: if
horseplay can be commingled with duty, why isn’t walking down a hallway at
work? Perpetrators of horseplay are entitled to compensation not because they
pose an increased risk of injury to themselves, but because the ‘arising’
element is satisfied unless the perpetrator had deviated from her employment.
Mitchell shows that the 1977 amendment was necessary to ensure that
compensation does not flow from a distinctly personal risk of injury, whether
in an idiopathic fall, or a personally motivated assault.
Because the legislative history is indeed contradictory, the Fetzer court
also found comfort in legislative revocation of the rule of liberal
construction.32 This is a slim reed, one that does not bear the weight. The
legislative history of the revocation of the rule of liberal construction
presents a caricature of the courts “second guessing” the Agency. Its major
proponent, Representative Carlson, thought that courts were liberally
construing the facts, stating: “cases are to be decided strictly based on the
facts of each case.”33 While premium rates were part of the discussion, the
actuary confirmed that rejection of the rule of liberal construction is “not
27. 536 N.W.2d at 685.
28. Id. at 684 (citing 1A LARSON, WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 23.00, 23.20,
23.60 (1995)).
29. 2 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 23.06. Victims of horseplay are now uniformly
compensated. Id. at § 23.02.
30. Id. at § 23.07[1].
31. Mitchell, 536 N.W.2d at 685. The perpetrator’s injury would have been compensable as the
“momentary act of horseplay was commingled with his duties.” Id.
32. Fetzer v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2012 ND 73, ¶ 12, 815 N.W.2d 539, 543
(citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01 (2011)).
33. Hearing on H.B. 1217 Before H. Judiciary Comm., 54th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1
(N.D. 1995) (statement of Rep. Carlson).
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projected to have a material impact on the required rate and loss reserve
levels of the Fund.”34 Senator Wayne Stenehjem observed that labor’s
concerns about the bill were “over-reacting,” citing cases that reject giving
liberal construction to the facts but allowing questions of law to be decided
based on “similar doctrines requiring reference to ‘legislative purpose
which prompted their enactment,’ as well as ‘the policy to be
accomplished,’ ‘the evil to be remedied, and the object to be obtained.’”35
It is also notable that the expansive coverage afforded to instigators of
horseplay in Mitchell was not dependent upon the rule of liberal
construction.36 Clearly, the abrogation of liberal construction in 1995 does
not logically instruct us what the Legislature had intended in adopting the
plain vanilla standard definition of compensable injury in 1977. While
providing benefits to instigators of horseplay may appear to benefit
employees, probably the primary effect of this rule is to shield employers
from suit. While the immunity shield is inviolate, the basic coverage
formulation as to the arising element is easily allowed to erode the right to
sure and certain relief.37 The liberal construction doctrine appeared to be a
feel-good mantra, cited to support a known outcome. More prescient were
the authors of Are Employees Obtaining “Sure and Certain Relief” Under
the 1995 Legislative Enactments of the North Dakota Workers
Compensation Act,38 who said “[p]erhaps the greatest travesty of the 1995
amendments was to deny the injured employee liberal construction under
the Workers’ Compensation Act.”39
B. MENTAL INJURIES
North Dakota is also deficient in its treatment of the mentally ill,
excluding from the definition of compensable injury any “mental injury
arising from mental stimulus.”40 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
commonly exists without a physical trauma.
The United States
34. Id. at 9 (The fiscal note states the change is not projected to have a material impact on
the Fund).
35. Hearing on H.B. 1217 Before S. Judiciary Comm., 54th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 14-16
(statement by Sen. Wayne Stenehjem) (citing Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 236
N.W.2d 870, 882 (N.D. 1975); Kash-N-Karry vs. Johnson, 617 So.2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993)).
36. The court observed in the footnote discussing the legislative history of SB 2158, that
“former cases” invoked the rule. Mitchell, 536 N.W.2d at 684 n.4.
37. See Haas, supra note 18, at 289-97.
38. Susan J. Anderson, and Gerald (Jud) Deloss, Are Employees Obtaining “Sure and
Certain Relief” Under the 1995 Legislative Enactments of the North Dakota Workers
Compensation Act, 72 N.D. L. REV. 349, 378-80 (1996).
39. Id. at 378.
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(10) (2013).
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Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs are deeply concerned about
PTSD, which is now known to be a typical reaction to severe mental
stress.41 Professor Larson is deeply critical of the “mental-mental”
exclusion, as “[t]here is nothing talismanic about physical impact,” and
unjustifiably shifts the risk of loss from the employer to employee.42 Early
on, courts grounded such awards in physical damage to the brain, stating
that the requirement of physical injury “must refer to the entire body . . . a
living, breathing, functioning individual . . . not as a static, inanimate
thing.”43 Medical science establishes the essential truth that the brain is a
physical thing that itself changes not only during personality formation and
under severe stress, but in the everyday as when memories form.44
Nevertheless, Professor Larson argues that once an employee establishes
damages with a causal connection to employment, the additional
requirement to identify the precise physical structures involved is “wearing
thin.”45
Frankly, there is no justification for this exclusion. The hostility
toward compensation for purely mental or emotional injuries demonstrated
by North Dakota and a significant minority of state legislatures is not
supported by science or any sound compensation principle. Indeed, the
exclusion highlights the dissonance between the legal and scientific
conceptions. This defense-minded strategy is based on the theory that
mental injuries are less real than physical ones and that they are not
generally work-related but attributable to the employee’s psychological
predisposition.46 The line between mental and physical injuries is
intellectually shabby, and inexcusably cheap to workers. Such mind/body
distinctions have been criticized by science and philosophy ever since its
most famous proponent, Rene Descartes, set it out in the terms by which it
is known today. This discord between compensation law on the one hand,
and ethics, economics, and science on the other is profoundly disturbing
41. The military has found that initial estimates of the incidence of PTSD must be revised
higher. See, e.g., DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, CONTRACTED REPORT OF FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIETNAM VETERANS’ READJUSTMENT STUDY (2013). See also Lisa K. Richardson et
al., Prevalence Estimates of Combat-Related PTSD: A Critical Review, 44 AUSTRALIAN AND
NEW ZEALAND J. OF PSYCHIATRY 4 (2010).
42. 3 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 56.04[1] (quoting Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay, & Carr Co.,
330 N.E.2d 603, 606 (N.Y. 1975)).
43. Bailey v. Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 279 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. 1955). See also Indemnity Ins.
Co. of N. Am. v. Loftis, 120 S.E.2d 655, 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961).
44. See, e.g., Lisa M. Shin et al., Regional Cerebral Blood Flow in the Amygdala and
Medial Prefrontal Cortex During Traumatic Imagery in Male and Female Vietnam Veterans With
PTSD, 61 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 168 (2004).
45. 3 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 56.04[1].
46. See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation Reform,
50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 783-87 (1998).
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because this shift of an employment risk to employees is not a rare event, as
there is increasing acknowledgment that workplace stress and mental
injuries are rampant.47
The idea that allowing mental stress claims will burden the system
because they are too easy to prove, shifting non-employment risks to the
employer are not tenable. The competing concepts are illustrated by a
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in 2005, where a majority upheld that
state’s mental/mental exclusion against an equal protection challenge,
giving short shrift to bank teller’s fright and emotional shock from being
robbed and diagnosed with PTSD.48 Rather, like Pilate was said to do, the
majority washed its hands of the iniquity, admitting that although
“psychological and psychiatric injuries may arise from an individual’s
employment, and we do not discount their impact on those who suffer
them,” nevertheless, the policy choice made by the state legislature did not
offend the constitution.49 The dissent is based in reality and found no
rational basis for distinguishing mental/mental injuries from those mental
injuries arising out of a physical insult to the body.50
North Dakota has also enacted a significantly restrictive statute
regarding coverage for mental injuries that arise from a physical injury,
adding the unrealistic requirement that the employee must prove the work
contribution is “at least fifty percent of the cause of the condition as
compared with all other contributing causes combined, and only when the
condition did not preexist the work injury.”51 WSI apparently reads the
statute to exclude compensation if there had been a previous diagnosis of
the psychological condition. It is as though destiny precludes a new
psychological injury. North Dakota law is extremely conservative and
punitive in this regard. The state should adopt the normal rule for
compensability of mental injuries—whether the work is a “substantial
contributing factor” to the condition claimed.52

47. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health notes that 25-40% of all
employees report significant job stress, more than with any other life stressor, including financial
problems and family problems. See National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
STRESS . . . At Work, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (1999), http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/99101/.
48. McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 839 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio 2005).
49. Id. at 10.
50. Justice Resnick observed: “[n]ow what kind of rational explanation or legitimate state
interest could possibly justify distinguishing the compensability of one posttraumatic stress
disorder from another under equivalent life-threatening circumstances based on the fortuity of a
stubbed toe?” Id. at 11-12 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(a)(6) (2013).
52. See, e.g., Ex parte Saad’s Healthcare Servs., Inc., 19 So.3d 862 (Ala. 2008) (quoting 3
LARSON’S WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW § 56.03[1] (2008)).
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C. NARROW CAUSATION UNDER THE TRIGGER STATUTE
As argued above, “but for” causal reasoning has, until recently,
satisfied the “arising” test, especially since the competing “increased risk”
test poses alternative history scenarios in which the employee could also
have been injured as a member of the general public.53 The exploration of
alternative histories that did not occur in our universe lead nowhere.
Causation is notoriously difficult in science and philosophy; as Professor
Prosser said, in some sense “the fatal trespass doe by Eve was cause of all
our woe.”54 Unfortunately, North Dakota is transfixed with one view of the
Necker cube in determining causation: an erroneous focus on preexisting
susceptibility to injury under the “trigger statute,” North Dakota Century
Code section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7).55
The statute, repeatedly amended, excludes benefits for preexisting
conditions, “including when the employment acts as a trigger to produce
symptoms in the preexisting . . . condition unless the employment
substantially accelerates its progression or substantially worsens its
severity.”56 Under WSI’s blinkered view of causation, the focus is on the
morphology. An MRI, for example, will show that degenerative disc
disease exists in most of us over age thirty or so, but most of us will not
have any symptoms. WSI commonly calls its medical consultant or an
independent medical examiner (“IME”) to testify that an employee’s work
injury “merely triggered symptoms” in degenerative disc disease but did not
alter the course of the “disease itself.”57 But which is the better measure of
a worsening: the change in the appearance of an MRI or the shattering of
the very health and life of the employee by injury? Though the North
Dakota Supreme Court has twice ruled that pain can be a significant
worsening of a preexisting condition,58 the battle continues to rage, as WSI
asked the 2013 Legislature to amend the statute to preclude a significant
change in pain complaints to evidence change in a preexisting condition.59
53. In a classic positional risk case, a court noted:
[t]he [alternative history] question whether or not the employee might have been
injured in the same way, and even at the same place and time had he not been
called there by the necessities of his employer’s business, but had gone there
only for his own pleasure or in pursuit of his own business, has nothing whatever
to do with the case.
Kern v. Southport Mill, 141 So. 19, 21 (La. 1932).
54. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 236 (5th ed. 1984).
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(10)(b)(7) (2013).
56. Id.
57. Haas, supra note 18, at 237-38.
58. See generally Mickelson v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2012 ND 164, 820 N.W.2d
333; Geck v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 158, 583 N.W.2d 621.
59. H.B. 1163, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).
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WSI’s litigation strategy elevates the “trigger statute” to an exception
that swallows the rule by forcing a tight focus on the preexisting
morphology to deny coverage. According to WSI’s Performance Evaluator,
the agency’s claims adjusters reported a “shift in management focus to a
more aggressive and in-depth search for prior injuries or preexisting/degenerative conditions, which could possibly reduce WSI liability
for the injury.”60 On paper, North Dakota continues to follow the wellknown and universally accepted maxim that susceptibility to injury is not
relevant, as the employer takes the employee as he finds him. 61 “Putatively,
almost every injury could, with sufficient scrutiny, be linked to some
preexisting weakness or susceptibility.”62 The North Dakota Supreme
Court has long held that “[t]he fact that an employee may have physical
conditions or personal habits which make him or her more prone to such an
injury does not constitute a sufficient reason for denying a claim . . . . To
the contrary, the work injury need only be a ‘substantial contributing
factor.’”63 In stark contrast to the current predilection to blame every spinal
complaint on preexisting morphology, the 1980s era North Dakota Supreme
Court held compensable a disc injury that, according to the treating
physician, resulted from “minute trauma” from her hair-dressing job,
causing the annulus “fibers supporting the disc [to] give way.”64
The foremost authority on workers’ compensation law, Professor
Larson, notes that “[n]othing is better established in compensation law than
the rule that, when industrial industry precipitates disability from a prior
latent condition, such as heart disease, cancer, back weakness and the like,
the entire disability is compensable,” and “degeneration and infirmities due
to age,” are not grounds for reduction of benefits.65 Larson states the
central tenant that susceptible employees are also entitled to sure and
certain relief, “the employer takes the employee as it finds that
employee”—thus, “[p]reexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does
not disqualify a claim under the ‘arising out of employment’ [causal]
requirement if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with
the disease or infirmity to produce the death or disability for which

60. N.D. WORKFORCE SAFETY & INSURANCE, 2008 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION (2008),
http://www nd.gov/auditor/reports/WSI_PE_08.pdf.
61. Bruns v. N.D. Worker’s Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 116, ¶ 16 n.2, 595 N.W.2d 298, 303
n.2.
62. Balliet v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 297 N.W.2d 791, 795 (N.D. 1980).
63. Manske v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2008 ND 79, ¶ 12, 748 N.W.2d 394, 397
(quoting Satrom v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 328 N.W.2d 824, 831 (N.D. 1982)).
64. Satrom, 328 N.W.2d at 830.
65. 5 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 90.04[1].
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compensation is sought.”66 Thus, the bedrock workers’ compensation
principle is to place the risk of loss on the industry that caused the
claimant’s damages. Any other result alters the basic bargain between
employees and employers in which employees exchange the right to sue
employers in tort in for “sure and certain relief” in the form of medical and
disability benefits.67
In 1998, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a compensable
aggravation of arthritis does include a worsening of symptoms.68 Applying
the former incarnation of the trigger statute, the administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) denied benefits concluding that the employment was “merely a
trigger,” to her pain.69 The ALJ also concluded that there was no evidence
that the employment was a substantial aggravating factor.70 Upon appeal,
the court reversed and remanded because there was evidence that the
employee’s work activities “resulted in her latent underlying condition of
arthritis becoming symptomatic and painful. Pain can be an aggravation of
an underlying condition of arthritis.”71 The majority found the distinction
between worsening the “condition itself” and the symptoms to be without
significance.72
Although the statute was subsequently amended, WSI’s then counsel,
Regan Pufall, advised the Legislature that “[t]his bill does not significantly
change the substance of this paragraph. It removes unnecessary and
confusing language.”73 Mr. Pufall testified that the trigger exclusion means
that a condition that is getting progressively worse is not compensable if it
merely takes a turn for the worse at work but is compensable if the
employment significantly alters the significance of the condition “so that it got
much worse more quickly than it would have otherwise.”74
The focus, as the Geck court found, is squarely on the significance of the
damages suffered by the injured employee. Accordingly, Professor Larson
observes that “denials of compensation in this category [due to a preexisting
condition] are almost entirely the result of holdings that the evidence did not
support a finding that the employment contributed to the final result

66. Id. at § 9.02[1].
67. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (2013).
68. Geck v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 158, 583 N.W.2d 621.
69. Id. ¶ 11, 583 N.W.2d at 624.
70. Id.
71. Id. ¶ 10.
72. Id.
73. See Hearing on H.B. 1269 Before H. Comm. on Indus., Bus., and Labor, 55th Leg.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. 5 (N.D. 1997) (testimony of Reagan Pufall).
74. Id.
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[damages].”75 Post Geck, the North Dakota Supreme Court repeatedly said
that it is not necessary under the “trigger statute” to show the employment
was the sole cause of the injury.76 Rather, to establish a causal connection
under the statute, the claimant must demonstrate his employment was “a
substantial contributing factor” to the disease or injury.77 Employment
plays a substantial causal role where it worsens or aggravates the preexisting condition, causing damages that would not have occurred but for
the employment.
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the issue numerous times
over the years, frequently upholding an ALJ’s findings of fact that the
claimant’s work injury merely “triggered symptoms” rather than
substantially worsened the preexisting condition. In Bruder v. North
Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance Fund,78 WSI attributed the
claimant’s pain to his degenerative disc disease that had been symptomatic
for many years before he filed his workers’ compensation claim.79
Similarly, in Bergum v. North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance,80
the claimant “had a long history of treatment for back pain,” which baseline
condition included “daily low back discomfort, and . . . the regular use of an
anti-inflammatory drug and a muscle relaxant.”81 Curran v. North Dakota
Workforce Safety and Insurance82 also details a long history of back
symptoms prior to the alleged work injury, triggered by bending down to
pick up a band-aid.83
While another ALJ might have found differently in these cases, the
courts will not overturn factual findings that a “reasoning mind” could have
made.84 Unfortunately, all too frequently the factual findings of ALJs are
conclusory as to whether the employee has proven a compensable
worsening. ALJs typically do not make any specific findings relating to the
change in the employee’s disability status and increased demand for
75. 1 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 9.02[4].
76. 2009 ND 23, ¶ 8, 761 N.W.2d 588, 591-92.
77. Id. at 592.
78. Id. ¶ 2, 761 N.W.2d at 590.
79. Id.
80. 2009 ND 52, 764 N.W.2d 178.
81. Id. ¶ 19, 764 N.W.2d at 184.
82. 2010 ND 227, 791 N.W.2d 622.
83. Id. ¶ 1, 791 N.W.2d at 622.
84. The court’s deferential review standard is well known; the court affirms the agency if a
reasoning mind “could have” reached the decision. See, e.g., Kershaw v. Workforce Safety &
Ins., 2013 ND 186, ¶ 10, 838 N.W.2d 429, 432. But the old cases retain a hint of true scrutiny of
fact-findings. See, e.g., Spangler v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 519 N.W. 2d 576, 578 (N.D.
1994) (remanding for the agency to conduct further examinations of the various medical opinions
on offer); Satrom v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 328 N.W.2d 824 (N.D. 1982) (reversing
based on the testimony of the treating physician).
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medical services stemming from the work injury. The cases illustrate that
the ALJs are more apt to focus only on whether or not the preexisting
condition substantially contributed to the final result, rather than on the
pertinent question: whether the work injury substantially contributed to the
final result. Damages, after all, are measured by the increased need for
medical care, and placing of work restrictions. It seems as though ALJs are
prone to finding a natural progression of any preexisting condition,
crediting IME doctors over treating physicians. But the focus is generally
on a progression of the preexisting morphology rather than on whether the
employee’s symptoms would have progressed in a similar manner but for
the work injury. Unfortunately, the predilection appears to be akin to the
judicial review of deferring to the agency rather than using a de novo
determination of the facts required for a fair hearing.
ALJs should be required to show critical examination of the effects of
both the preexisting condition and the work injury in the findings. This
might be accomplished if the courts critically review the findings of WSI as
it once did. Alternatively, if WSI is actually interested in an even-handed
adjudication, it could promulgate an administrative rule detailing the criteria
by which a significant worsening of the condition is proved. For example,
the OSHA Recordkeeping Handbook85 provides an industry example of the
definition of a significant aggravation of a pre-existing condition, defining a
significant aggravation of a pre-existing injury to include “[o]ne or more
days away from work, or days of restricted work” due to injury, or
“[m]edical treatment in a case where no medical treatment was needed for
the injury or illness before the workplace event or exposure, or a change in
medical treatment was necessitated by the workplace event or exposure.”86
In 2012, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in Mickelson v. North
Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance,87 again stressed that the root of the
issue is whether the claimant’s pre-existing injury or condition is such that
its clinical course would naturally progress on its own timetable without
regard to the employment in which the employee was engaged. The court
clarified that to afford compensation, the employment contribution must “in
some real, true, important, or essential way [make] the preexisting injury,

85. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, OSHA RECORD KEEPING
HANDBOOK: THE REGULATION AND RELATED INTERPRETATION FOR RECORDING AND
REPORTING
OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES
AND
ILLNESS
14
(2006),
https://www.osha.gov/Publications/recordkeeping/OSHA_3245_REVISED.pdf.
86. Id.
87. 2012 ND 164, 820 N.W.2d 333.
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disease or other condition more unfavorable, difficult, unpleasant, or
painful.”88
The Mickelson court
decline[d] to construe [the statute] so narrowly as to require only
evidence of a substantial worsening of the disease itself to
authorize an award of benefits. Rather, the statute . . . requires
consideration of whether the preexisting injury, disease or other
condition would have progressed similarly in the absence of
employment.89
The court said that “employment can also substantially worsen the
severity, or substantially accelerate the progression of a preexisting injury,
disease, or other condition when employment acts as a substantial
contributing factor to substantially increase a claimant’s pain. That
conclusion is consistent with our decision in Geck, that pain can be a
substantial aggravation of an underlying latent condition.”90 The ALJ, the
court said:
misapplied the law by looking too narrowly at . . . degenerative
disc disease itself without considering whether his injury, disease,
or other condition would likely not have progressed similarly in
the absence of his employment so as to substantially accelerate the
progression or substantially worsen the severity of his injury,
disease, or other condition.91
The case was remanded to WSI.
D. WSI INTRODUCED THE “PAIN BILL,” H.B. 1163, IN AN EFFORT TO
ELIMINATE PAIN AS EVIDENCE OF A WORSENING
IN A PREEXISTING CONDITION
In reaction to Mickelson, WSI offered legislation to amend the “trigger
statute,” North Dakota Century Code section 65-01-02(10)(b)(7), to provide
that “[p]ain is a symptom and is not a substantial acceleration or substantial
worsening of a preexisting injury, disease, or other condition.”92 WSI
representatives testified in favor of this drastic change to the law, yet
contending that Mickelson represented a change in interpretation of the

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. ¶ 36, 820 N.W.3d at 346.
Id. ¶ 21, 820 N.W.2d at 342.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 23, 820 N.W.2d at 344.
H.B. 1163, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).
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statute.93 In support of the pain bill, WSI representatives further advocated
that an employee need not be taken “as is.”94 For, taking the employee as is
forcefully contradicts WSI’s theory that even a drastic change in symptoms
is not compensable if the morphology does not change. Clearly, under
WSI’s favored interpretation, an employee’s preexisting susceptibility to
injury due to aging joints and discs is a defense. Fortunately, the bill did
not pass as introduced, but it is remarkable that it was offered in this stark
form.
This legislation reflects a profound misunderstanding of the effects of
pain on life. Pain is a primary generator of medical treatment. Pain is often
disabling. The legislation offered by WSI could preclude compensation for
chronic pain if the ALJ, like the IME examiner, focuses only on the
morphology of the preexisting condition rather than on the effects of the
injury. Claimants’ advocates have noted that WSI commonly calls the IME
examiner to testify that the preexisting condition is unchanged by the
injury, and thus said to show a simple “natural progression” of the
preexisting condition. In many cases, claimants’ lawyers lament, the IME
examiner does so without reference to the changes in the employee’s
clinical condition, relying solely on whether the “objective” appearance of
the condition appears changed on an MRI. Yet, the worker’s life might be
utterly shattered and ruined.
Such unremitting pain creates a demand for medical care, including
treatments in chronic pain programs, and may impel the doctor to place the
employee under work restrictions. Employees whose very lives are ruled
by pain, unable to engage in the activities of daily living, to work, to sleep,
to do anything at all without constant use of pain medications, have
described this ruinous existence as a living hell. Who among us would not
recognize this as a significant worsening in the life of a family member?
What, after all, is the purpose of workers’ compensation if we do not care
about the effect of the injury on life and health in determining
compensation? WSI’s disturbing focus on preexisting morphology and
discounting pain is highlighted by a case Parsons v. Workforce Safety and
Insurance Fund,95 which was pending at the time H.B. 1163 was under
consideration in the Legislature. In that case, despite an IME examiner who
found the claimant sustained a disc tear and cervical strain from his truck
driving job, the ALJ denied the claim because his preexisting condition
made him “especially vulnerable to injury,” and the work injury had
93. Hearing on H.B. 1163 Before the H. Comm. on Indus., Bus., and Labor, 63d Leg.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. 49 (N.D. 2013) (testimony of Tim Whalin).
94. Id.
95. 2013 ND 235, 841 N.W.2d 404.
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resolved by the time of the hearing, and did not cause “significant damage”
to the disc.96 It is discouraging that the dissent would have affirmed,
elevating the susceptibility to an absolute defense, on the premise that this
was simply a fact question.97
Opponents of the pain bill noted that Parsons proved that WSI’s
construction of the already conservative statute made the preexisting
condition exclusion an exception that swallows the rule—elevating
susceptibility to an absolute defense. While WSI supported this legislation,
it could not find one independent physician to testify in favor. Its medical
consultant did testify in favor, stating that “[n]o physician can reliably
measure pain,” but “if the Mickelson case progresses to where a person’s
report of increased pain in a preexisting condition establishes a
compensable injury, unreliability will become prevalent in the system.” 98
WSI’s medical consultant claimed that despite the language in the
legislation that “pain is a symptom and not a substantial acceleration or
substantial worsening of a preexisting injury, disease, or other condition,”
the bill “does not eliminate the symptom of pain as an important evidence
of a work injury.”99
As a result of persistent opposition to this legislation, including from
Senator Ralph Kilzer, a physician and former medical consultant for WSI,
the bill was amended to state “[p]ain is a symptom and may be considered
in determining whether there is a substantial acceleration or substantial
worsening of a preexisting injury, disease, or other condition, but pain alone
is not a substantial acceleration or a substantial worsening.”100 The
legislation does not alleviate Chief Justice VandeWalle’s concern about the
failure of the statute to distinguish a substantial worsening in the severity of
an underlying condition from those in which pain is simply a symptom
triggered by employment.101 But, the Mickelson court’s focus on whether
there is a natural progression points the way: has the employment
96. Id. ¶ 16, 841 N.W.2d at 409. The majority explained that the “ALJ misapplied the law
in finding the injury was attributable to Parsons’ preexisting condition because the preexisting
condition made him more susceptible to the injury.” Id. ¶ 19, 841 N.W.2d at 410.
97. Id. ¶ 29, 841 N.W.2d at 413 (Crothers, J., dissenting). As in Mickelson, WSI’s exclusive
focus is on the morphology; it was not disputed that the work had caused Parsons physical injuries
(a disc tear and cervical/trapezius strain) and had caused him significant damage—medical
expenses and disability. WSI’s focus on mere morphology is misplaced, “[p]utatively, almost
every injury could, with sufficient scrutiny, be linked to some preexisting weakness or
susceptibility.” Balliet v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 297 N.W.2d 791, 794 (N.D. 1980)
(emphasis added).
98. Hearing on H.B. 1163, supra note 93, at 98-99 (testimony of Gregory Peterson).
99. Id. at 99.
100. Hearing on H.B. 1163, supra note 93, at 123.
101. Mickelson v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2012 ND 164, ¶ 30, 820 N.W.2d 333,
345 (VandeWalle, C.J., specially concurring).
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substantially changed the nature of the medical care needed and the
disability, or has it not? If medical care is periodically needed both before
and after an employment incident that caused an employee to go to the
doctor, a simple flare-up in a condition prone to flare-ups is probably not
compensable.
The best place to start is to measure the change in the employee’s
clinical course: the medical attention required and the work restrictions
placed. The Federal Workers Compensation Act attempts to distinguish the
mere manifestation of the preexisting injury at work from an aggravation,
stating that “the fact that the condition manifests itself during a period of
federal employment” is not “sufficient in itself to establish causal
relationship.”102 However, the regulations and cases show that a condition
is compensable if the injury acted on the preexisting condition and
temporarily or permanently aggravated it.103 Similarly, OSHA is of the
view that an employment injury that substantially alters the need for
medical attention is a significant worsening of a preexisting condition.104
The outright oddity of the pain bill is further highlighted by the fact
that the Legislature had agreed in 2009 that the preexisting condition issue
required study, recognizing that North Dakota law excluding coverage for
preexisting conditions is more restrictive than other jurisdictions.105 In
recommending study of the issue, the 2009 House Resolution cited WSI’s
2008 Performance Evaluation documenting North Dakota’s extremely
conservative approach to deny claims based on presence of preexisting
morphology.106 Thus, Study Recommendation 6.6 was to create a “study
group formed of all the stakeholder groups . . . to review how other
jurisdictions’ statutes handle these important Workers’ Compensation
issues.”107
Rather than engage all “stakeholder[s],” WSI itself presented
information to the Legislature’s interim committee, and asked the next

102. 20 C.F.R. § 10.1115(e) (2009).
103. See OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, INJURY COMPENSATION FOR
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES (1994), http://www.dol.gov/owcp/regs/compliance/feca810m htm#3. The
handbook provides that determining the causal relationship “is based entirely on medical evidence
provided by physicians who have examined and treated the employee.” Id. at § 3(5). Under the
federal rules, both temporary and permanent aggravations are compensated. “Permanent
aggravation occurs when a condition will persist indefinitely due to the effects of the work-related
injury or when a condition is materially worsened by a factor of employment such that it will not
return to the pre-injury state.” Id. at § 3(5)(b). This focus is proper, as it measures the effect of
the employment on the damages and the need for medical care and disability.
104. See OSHA RECORD KEEPING HANDBOOK, supra note 60, at 73.
105. H. Con. Res. 3008, 61st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess 1 (N.D. 2009).
106. 2008 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS, supra note 57, at 111.
107. Id.
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performance evaluator, Sedgwick, to address the issue.108 Sedgwick
averred that although some other states might be as conservative as North
Dakota in attributing damages to preexisting conditions, the state is not a
lone outlier.109 Sedgwick cited case law from Wisconsin for this
proposition.110
Contrary to Sedgwick’s characterization of Wisconsin cases as equally
conservative as the North Dakota statute, the test in that state is whether the
work injury caused a substantial change in symptoms “in the form of a
precipitation, aggravation, and acceleration of the applicant’s preexisting
back condition beyond normal progression.”111 In discussing “normal
progression” to determine compensability, the Wisconsin courts use a
similar test as expounded in Mickelson, that compensation depends upon:
whether or not the underlying preexisting injury, disease, or other
condition would likely have progressed similarly in the absence of
employment . . . . We decline to construe those terms so narrowly
as to require only evidence of a substantial worsening of the
disease itself to authorize an award of benefits.112
Sedgwick is not reliable for the claim that North Dakota law is not an
outlier. The dissent in Geck had earlier also offered case authority said to
deny that a significant change in pain complaints constitutes a compensable
aggravation of a preexisting condition. For example, the dissent said that in
Oregon a work injury did not cause any new anatomical injuries that could
be observed is not compensable, even though it “aggravated” her
preexisting condition as it increased her pain.113 However, this was a claim
for occupational disease which is distinguished from accidental injuries in
that occupational disease is not unexpected and are recognized as an
108. NORTH DAKOTA WORKFORCE SAFETY AND INSURANCE, 2010 PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
88-98
(2010),
https://www.workforcesafety.com/library/documents/reports/PerformanceEvaluation8-09-10.pdf.
109. Id. at 93.
110. Id. (explaining that “Wisconsin precludes benefits for any injury or condition preexisting at the time of employment with the employer against whom a claim is made.”).
111. Greenfield Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm’n, 776 N.W.2d 288,
291 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). See also Aurora Health Care Metro, Inc. v. Labor &
Indus. Review Comm’n, 776 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that an increase in
the limitations on the employee’s daily living and work restrictions showed an “aggravation,
acceleration and precipitation of her preexisting condition beyond its normal progression”);
Emerson Elec. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 686 N.W.2d 456 (finding that the
employee’s actual living (clinical) condition is simply due to a natural progression of a preexisting
degenerative disc disease).
112. Mickleson v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2012 ND 164, ¶ 21, 820 N.W.2d 303,
342.
113. Geck v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 158, ¶ 20, 583 N.W.2d 621, 625
(Sanstrom J., dissenting) (citing In re Hall v. Home Ins. Co., 651 P.2d 186, 187 (Or. Ct. App.
1982)).
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inherent risk of continued exposure to conditions of the particular
employment and are gradual rather than sudden in onset.114 Thus,
aggravation of symptoms makes no sense for occupational disease claims.
Oregon analyzes most cases under the “combined condition” statute, which
provides:
If an otherwise compensable injury combines at any time with a
preexisting condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for
treatment, the combined condition is compensable only if, so long
as and to the extent that the otherwise compensable injury is the
major contributing cause of the disability of the combined
condition or the major contributing cause of the need for treatment
of the combined condition.115
As in federal law, Oregon holds that if the work injury changes the
work restrictions sufficiently to cause disability or causes the claimant to
require medical attention not previously needed, the entire condition is
compensable.
The Geck dissent also cited a number of cases from Tennessee to argue
that pain cannot constitute a compensable aggravation.116 Tennessee law is
more nuanced, providing that if a work injury advances the severity of the
pre-existing condition or the employee suffers a new distinct injury other
than increased pain, then the work injury is compensable.117 In other
words, if pain is said by the claimant’s doctors to be indicative of an injury,
as is inflammation or microscopic tearing, the clinical worsening can be
compensable.
Medical causation recognizes that pain is normally
indicative of an injury. Nature designed this feedback mechanism to avoid
additional injuries, including the everyday wear and tear that if allowed to
accumulate unnoticed, can result in much more significant damage to the
body.
ALJ’s should not focus solely on ‘natural progression of

114. In re Hall, 651 P.2d at 188.
115. OR. REV. STAT. § 656.005(7)(a)(B) (2012).
116. Geck, ¶¶ 22-23, 583 N.W.2d at 626 (citing Towsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434 (Tenn.
2002); Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 811 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1991); Smith v.
Smith’s Transfer Corp., 735 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. 1987)).
117. See Trosper v. Armstrong Wood Prod., Inc., 273 S.W.3d 598, 604-07 (Tenn. 2008).
See also Vawter v. Volunteer Mgmt. Dev., No. W2012-00471-SC-WCM-WC, 2013 WL 542812,
at *4 (Tenn. Feb. 13, 2013) (finding that although work activities did not “progress” her condition,
the fact that work made it “more symptomatic and painful” with “an anatomical explanation for
the increase in [claimant’s] symptoms during her [employment]” was sufficient to afford
compensation). North Dakota must similarly focus on the effects of the work injury, rather than on
the morphology. Unfortunately, many Administrative Law Judges continue to find credible the
ipse dixit opinion of IME examiners who blithely conclude that the work injury did not
substantially worsen a preexisting condition. This leads to an inordinate number of denials that
are then upheld on appeal for reasons of fact.
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morphology,’ as do most IME examiners, but also the change in the
employee’s need for medical care and in work restrictions caused by the
work aggravation.
As introduced, H.B. 1163 would have expressly denied for all
employees any opportunity to establish that a significant increase in pain
from an employment injury constitutes a significant worsening in a
preexisting degenerative condition. This offends basic compensation
principles, and North Dakota law has never so held. Even as enacted, the
legislation is a retrograde step, as it questions the central principle of
workers’ compensation law, which states that the industry that created the
risk of damage to the employee must bear the loss. While WSI argued at
the legislative hearing that North Dakota does not necessarily follow this
sacrosanct principle that the worker should be taken “as is,” as yet the North
Dakota Supreme Court continues to hold that simple susceptibility to injury
is not a defense.118 In tort law the focus is on whether or not the injury
produced the symptoms and damages,119 not on the appearance of the MRI
for MRIs of the spine show a near universal affliction of aging discs by age
thirty. After all, MRIs of the spine show a near universal affliction of aging
discs by age thirty. But most people are not symptomatic, and DDD itself
does not necessarily correlate with its appearance on the MRI. WSI created
a straw man arguing that absent this legislation, the agency will become a
general insurance carrier, on the theory that simple triggering of any
symptom will be compensable. This is nonsense. As the discussion of
federal law on this point shows, preexisting conditions that are progressing
of their own accord and on their own natural timetable are not worsened
beyond their normal progression by simple manifestation of symptoms in
the workplace. WSI also threatened the legislature with the portent of dire
financial consequences if the law was not changed. This cry of wolf also
does not wash, since the Court has given the statute the same legal meaning
from 1998 through the present, without any negative financial
consequences to the fund. This legislation, which may allow WSI to blame
an injury on the employee’s susceptibility to injury due to abnormal
morphology, mocks sure and certain relief.
118. Manske v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2008 ND 79, ¶12, 748 N.W.2d 394, 397;
Bruns v. N.D. Worker’s Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 116, ¶ 16 n.2, 595 N.W.2d 298, 303 n.2.
119. Modern tort principles distinguish between the eggshell plaintiff doctrine and the
aggravation doctrine. The eggshell plaintiff rule applies when the condition had been
asymptomatic prior to injury, which is distinct from the aggravation doctrine that applies when
there is a prior symptomatic injury. Rowe v. Munye, 702 N.W.2d 729, 740-41 (Minn. 2005)
(noting difference between aggravation and eggshell-plaintiff rules); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 cmt. a (1965) (noting that eggshell-plaintiff rule applies to “peculiar
physical condition” of the plaintiff).
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E. THE AGGRAVATION STATUTE
Few commentators support a reduction in benefits in the circumstances
in which a work injury acts upon a preexisting injury combining to produce
damages. The 1972 National Commission on Workers Compensation
recommended that full compensation be paid to an employee when both
work and nonwork causes substantially contribute to an injury or disease.120
Similarly, Professor Larson notes that the “great majority” of compensation
acts do not reduce benefits under an apportionment of cause theory.121
Sedgwick recommended in its performance evaluation that the aggravation
statute be repealed,122 under the sound analysis that though only forty cases
per year were afflicted by the statute, “[a]necdotal comments from WSI
claim staff indicates that it is very difficult for the claim staff to identify an
aggravation case when it is presented.”123
Unfortunately, North Dakota has an apportionment statute,124 which
was once liberally construed in favor of injured workers,125 but now
conceivably applies in any case in which a prior condition is said by an
IME examiner to “contribute” to an injury, as in increasing the risk of
recurrence.126 Nearly any prior injury can theoretically qualify under this
interpretation of the aggravation statute to reduce a worker’s benefits to half
of what they should be, for whether a “causal relation” exists between the
prior injury and the recurrence is completely within the eye of the beholder.
This lax causation test is a lamentable retreat from the objective criteria
once applied by the court: whether the prior injury continued to be disabling
120. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT OF
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS 51 (1972),
http://workerscompresources.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Introduction-Summary.pdf.
121. 5 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 90.03.
122. See 2010 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS, supra note 108, at 98.
123. Id. at 96.
124. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15(1) (2013) (providing an acute period of 100%
coverage for the first sixty days); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-15(3) (2013) (providing a
presumption that the apportionment is 50% to the work injury and 50% to the nonwork injury or
condition).
125. Formerly, the court liberally construed the requirement in the statute that to reduce and
apportion benefits, the prior injury must be “known in advance of the work injury,” and must have
“caused previous work restriction or interference with physical function.” See, e.g., Elliott v. N.D.
Workers Comp. Bureau, 435 N.W.2d 695, 698 (N.D. 1989); Jepson v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp.
Bureau, 417 N.W.2d 184, 185 (N.D. 1987).
126. Mickelson v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2000 ND 67, ¶ 1, 609 N.W.2d 74, 75. In
this case, the court upheld the Bureau’s reduction of the claim to a 50% award under the
aggravation statute because an independent medical evaluator concluded that a healed injury from
four years previously somehow made a causal contribution to the severity of a second injury to
that area of the body. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 609 N.W.2d at 74-75. The notion of cause is a notoriously
difficult one in science. In fact, the National Commission, Professor Larson, and Sedgwick agree
that the aggravation statute is not based on sound compensation principles, and should be
repealed.
THE
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or impairing at the time of the work injury. The aggravation statute should
be repealed as it can be applied to any claim in which a prior injury or
condition can be said by an IME doctor to elevate the risk of recurrence.
III. MEDICAL NECESSITY DETERMINATIONS
WSI is responsible to provide an injured employee “reasonable and
appropriate” medical services “necessary” to treat a compensable injury.127
WSI frequently denies benefits—including medical benefits—for lack of
sufficient causal relationship between employment and injury. In such case,
the employee has a right to a hearing under North Dakota Century Code
chapter 28-32. But WSI also denies medical care for lack of medical necessity
under North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-20. Here, the Legislature
has created an odd—and arguably unconstitutional—alternative dispute
resolution mechanism to resolve medical necessity disputes.128 The statute
provides that any “managed care” dispute is subject to “binding dispute
resolution” (“BDR”), which is not subject to the procedural protections in
the North Dakota’s Administrative Agencies Practices Act, found in North
Dakota Century Code chapter 28-32.129 While the Legislature has directed
WSI to “make rules for the procedures,” the administrative code provision
does not contain any procedural protections to safeguard due process of
law.130

A. THE RIGHT TO “REASONABLE AND NECESSARY” MEDICAL CARE
SHOULD BE HELD A PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHT
Unfortunately, after studiously avoiding the constitutional issue, the
North Dakota Supreme Court recently decided that an injured employee
does not have a protected property right regarding the appropriate prosthetic
device to replace a hand.131
Remarkably, the court decided the
constitutional issue even though the employee made the argument for the
first time on appeal.132 The majority did not cite a single case holding an
127. N D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-07 (2013).
128. N D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-20 (2013).
129. Id.
130. The administrative code merely advises that the decision-makers—the identity of
whom are not specified—shall review “the relevant information in the record,” and may “request
additional information or documentation.” N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-46(5) (2013).
131. Whedbee v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins. Fund, 2014 ND 79, 845 N.W.2d 632.
132. Whedbee filed a Notice of Appeal and Specification of Issue in McKenzie County
asserting the myoelectric prosthesis is cost-effective and medically appropriate, and requesting
reversal of WSI’s BDR decision Id. ¶ 6, 845 N.W.2d at 634. Normally, of course, the court
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employee does not have a property right to receive reasonable and
necessary medical care. Instead, the court shifted focus, claiming that
medical benefits were not denied, but that merely “one prosthetic device
was approved over another. [Claimant] does not have a protectable
property interest in receiving one device over another, here, a myoelectric
prosthesis rather than a body-powered prosthesis.”133 The court said that an
employee “must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to [the benefit.] A
crucial factor in determining whether a particular statutory benefit
constitutes a property interest is the nature and degree of discretion given to
the governmental administrator in awarding or denying the benefit.”134
According to the court, the employee must prove entitlement to the specific
medical benefit before having a protectable property right in fair process in
making this very determination. This ignores that injured workers are
entitled to reasonable and necessary medical care under the Workers
Compensation Act; WSI does not have unfettered discretion to award or
simply deny reasonable and necessary medical care.
The United States Supreme Court has explained that an individual has
a protected property interest under statutory schemes that set out a right to
benefits if certain criteria are met that do not allow program administrators
to use unfettered discretion to award or deny benefits.135 The Act does not
provide WSI with discretion to deny medical care but sets out a right to care
under lawful criteria. The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that an
applicant for medical benefits has a protected property right in a fair
process to determine the nature of reasonable and necessary medical care.136
The question as to the whether a protected property right exists cannot
logically depend upon the subsequent determination in the hearing as to the
precise nature of that care. That would be the very definition of the cart
before the horse.
The North Dakota Supreme Court had already held that an applicant for
workers compensation benefits has the right to a fair hearing under the
constitutional due process guarantee.137 Significantly, the court did not only
rely upon North Dakota Century Code chapter 28-32 in concluding that a
formal hearing was required, but extensively discussed the constitutional
refuses to address issues not raised in the district court. See Risovi v. Job Service North Dakota,
2014 ND 60, ¶ 12, 845 N.W.2d 15, 20.
133. Wheddbee, ¶ 11, 845 N.W.2d at 635.
134. Id. (quoting Ennis v. Williams Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 493 N.W.2d 675, 678 (N.D.
1992) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted)).
135. Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
136. Giaimo v. City of New Haven, 778 A.2d 33, 48-50 (Conn. 2001) (distinguishing Am.
Mfg. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999)).
137. Steele v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 273 N.W.2d 692, 702 (N.D. 1978).
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guarantee of due process that require the result.138 In construing chapter 2832 to require due process safeguards, the court held that the applicant for
workers’ compensation benefits had a right to a formal hearing.139 It would
be odd indeed that the claimant denied a five-day claim for disability
benefits is entitled to due process, but an employee who has lost a hand is
not.
While primitive societies are rightly criticized for an eye for an eye
justice, by at least one measure, the law of talion values life and limb more
than we do:
Our modern economies thrive because we tend to limit personal
liability. If I sell you a defective ladder, and you fall and break
your neck, I may have to pay you some compensation. But I will
not have to pay you nearly as much as I would be willing to pay
not to having my own neck broken. In our society we are
constrained by the value a court puts on the other guys neck; in a
culture ruled by talion law, we are constrained by the value we
place on our own.140
Any reasonable measure of the value of a hand must be measured from
the view of the man or woman who lost one. Unfortunately, an employee
who suffers the devastating injury of the loss of a hand at work is not
afforded a fair and impartial hearing.
B. THE BDR PROCESS DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY PROCEDURAL
PROTECTIONS TO ENSURE A FAIR HEARING AND SHOULD BE
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The administrative rule does not provide for an in-person hearing, a
right to appear through counsel, or a right to cross-examine. The decision is
made by WSI employees, and the procedure itself is opaque—and so nearly
immune from meaningful review—as the BDR decision does not contain
findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain the grounds of the
decision.141 Because WSI probably cannot lose a medical necessity appeal
under the limited review standard, the agency is prone to decide even
causation questions under the BDR statute, bypassing that annoying right to
a hearing.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. SAM HARRIS, THE MORAL LANDSCAPE: HOW SCIENCE CAN DETERMINE HUMAN
VALUES 61 n.93 (2001).
141. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-20 (2013).
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If the Legislature or a subsequent court corrects the Whedbee error that
an employee who loses a hand does not have a protectable property right, it
seems apparent that the BDR procedure currently in use by WSI must also
be altered to provide some minimal level of due process. For example, in
Jassek v. North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance,142 counsel argued
that although there are many ways to afford basic procedural protections,143
the Administrative Code provides none of them. In contrast to the
requirement in the APA that findings of fact and conclusions of law be entered
to explain the grounds of the decision,144 the BDR determination provides
only the brute conclusion denying that the care is medically necessary.
Moreover, the BDR decision-makers include claims personnel whose
participation would be precluded under the APA.145
Mr. Jassek challenged WSI’s binding dispute resolution determination
that a hook device was a sufficient prosthetic device for his amputated left
hand, rather than the state of the art myoelectric devices, such as provided
to our nation’s military. As to the merits, WSI hired an IME examiner who
determined that since his job exposed him to grease, the myoelectric device
was not the most cost-effective.146 However, the IME examiner did not
take into account Mr. Jassek’s whole life and the recommendation and plea
of his medical provider: “if I lost my hand in a work place accident . . . I hope
that I would be offered the chance that would give me the best [device].”147
142. 2013 ND 69, 830 N.W.2d 582.
143. The court has held that although an agency deciding adjudicative facts is acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity, the minimal due process that must be afforded participants are not
necessarily synonymous with minimal requirements in a court of law. First Am. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Ellwein, 221 N.W.2d 509, 514 (N.D. 1974). Rather, the court, in Steele v. North Dakota
Worker’s Compensation Bureau, quoted the Eldridge three part balancing test to determine the
nature of the process due: (1) the private interest that will be affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards; and, (3) the Government’s
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional procedural requirement
would entail. 273 N.W.2d 692, 699 (N.D. 1978) (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
341-43 (1976)).
144. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-39 (2013). The court has also said that:
WSI has the responsibility to weigh the credibility of medical evidence and resolve
conflicting medical opinions . . . [T]he authority to reject medical evidence selectively
does not permit WSI to pick and choose in an unreasoned manner. WSI must consider
the entire record, clarify inconsistencies, and adequately explain its reasons for
disregarding medical evidence favorable to the claimant.
Huwe v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2008 ND 47, ¶ 10, 746 N.W.2d 158, 161-62.
145. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-37, 38 (2013).
146. Excessive concern about cost by the very agency deciding benefits has long troubled
the courts. A Louisiana court acknowledged that “some of the policy considerations raised in
[claimant’s] brief, notably that case managers work for the compensation carrier and thus are
motivated to reduce medical expenses.” Reed v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 8 So.3d 824, 829 (La. Ct.
App. 2009).
147. See Brief for Appellant at ¶ 21, Jassek v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2013 ND 69,
830 N.W.2d 582.
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The U.S. military provides hundreds of soldiers with state of the art
myoelectric prosthesis, and it is difficult to understand why WSI should not
be compelled to restore a more useful hand than a hook to injured
employees. Sadly, despite the devastating injury of the loss of a hand at
work, Mr. Jassek was not given an in-person hearing. He and other
similarly situated persons are not allowed to cross-examine witnesses, and
he did not have an independent tribunal.
Echoing Eldridge balancing,148 Judge Friendly argued that agencies
should be allowed to experiment with various procedural rules to guarantee
due process, contending that perhaps some of the formal rules as right to
cross examine may be relaxed if the decision maker is truly independent.149
As we engage in Eldridge balancing, it is important to keep in mind the
standards set by the United States Supreme Court for evidentiary hearings,
which include:
(1) timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the
proposed termination; (2) an effective opportunity for the recipient
to defend by confronting any adverse witness and by presenting
his own arguments and evidence orally; (3) retain counsel if
desired; (4) an impartial decision-making; (5) a decision resting
solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing; and
(6) a statement of reasons for the decision and the evidence relied
on.150
However, the procedures required must be flexible, and recognize that
all medical necessity questions are not equal. It is one thing to afford little
process for a claim for an additional chiropractic treatment and another to
give a man a hook instead of a myoelectric hand. The Whedbee court’s
concern that “if all managed care decisions merited a trial-type process, the
increased administrative costs would be too great to justify the perceived
benefit of the hearings”151 is misplaced because the extent of the procedural
protection provided should be closely tied to the nature of the medical care
sought. Additionally, the court overlooked that attorney’s fees are both

148. Eldridge balancing applies to questions of adjudicative fact, not in regulatory matters
(where legislative facts are at issue). In the latter case, a trial-type hearing is not available because
even though the private interests affected may be high, the value of additional safeguards is
considered to be minimal, given that the agency weighs the legislative facts of the regulated
industry as a whole. II RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 813-15 (5th ed. 2010).
149. Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-80 (1975).
150. Steele v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 273 N.W.2d 692, 700 n.4 (N.D. 1975).
151. Whedbee v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins. Fund, 2014 ND 29, ¶ 12, 845 N.W.2d 632,
636.
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contingent on prevailing and limited to 20% of the value of the award.152
There is no risk that WSI will be flooded with utilization review hearings.
1. WSI’s BDR does not Employ an Independent Decision-Maker
and is Opaque to Meaningful Judicial Review
To the layperson, the most disturbing aspect of administrative law is
that the decision-maker is the agency that decided against him; indeed, the
very individuals involved in the investigation may have also acted as the
hearing officers. Under criteria adopted by the APA, an individual who had
served as “investigator, prosecutor, or advocate in the investigatory or
prehearing stage of an adjudicative proceeding [may not] serve as hearing
officer.”153 Such standard provisions in Administrative Agencies Practice
Acts “supplement” the “due process requirement of a neutral
decisionmaker.”154 Clearly, if North Dakota Century Code chapter 28-32
were applicable, the BDR decision maker (the BDR Director, the Medical
Director and the Claims Adjuster or supervisor) could not act as both the
investigators and hearing officers nor, as hearing officers, engage in the exparte contacts with WSI’s claims department. WSI’s BDR is far from the
unbiased Tribunal required by due process.
In fact, “[s]cholars and judges consistently characterize provision of a
neutral decision maker as one of the three or four core requirements of a
system of fair adjudicatory decision making.”155 In the eyes of the
claimant, prior participation constitutes bias.156 Distrust of a bureaucracy
that appears intent on denying and disputing entitlement is normal human
reaction, and Judge Friendly wisely notes that this “is surely one reason for
the clamor for adversary proceedings in the United States.”157 Judge
Friendly is prescient as he observes that ensuring impartiality with “less
reliance on the bureaucracy for decision making” might best address the
issue.158 A neutral decision maker that might lessen the need for the full
panoply of procedural protections is one “with no connection with the
agency . . . .”159
Clearly, the procedural safeguards typical of a trial-type hearing are
especially important when the tribunal is the agency rather than an
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-08 (2013).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-38(1) (2013).
II PIERCE, supra note 148, at 846.
Id.
Friendly, supra note 149, at 1279.
Id. at 1279-80.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1289.
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independent ALJ. The combination of a BDR Tribunal composed of WSI
employees, without any procedural protections such as right to counsel,
right to testify, to cross-examine and rebut, is extremely troubling. From
what it appears, WSI employees have not proven to be wholly impartial
decision makers.
The appearance of impropriety is high, which is compounded by WSI’s
failure to provide adequate procedural protections, or to even address the
evidence favorable to the employee in the BDR decision. Because the
courts will review any decision under the extremely deferential abuse of
discretion standard, the failure to set out detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law makes a mockery of the employee’s right to judicial
review.
2. The BDR Does Not Allow Cross-Examination
and an In-Person Hearing
North Dakota law is also deficient because those subject to BDR are
given a paper-only review and are not afforded opportunity to meet the
decision makers to present the claim in person. Judge Friendly notes that
few administrative schemes are disposed to deny the right to call
witnesses.160 The ability to present a case in one’s own way is fundamental
to human engagement. Most injured employees seeking a usable prosthetic
or surgical cure will especially appreciate the opportunity to testify inperson, face to face.
The right to present a case in his or her own way is fundamental to fair
process. Those practitioners in this area of law know the impact of a formal
hearing where we meet the actual human being referred to bloodlessly in
the records: minds change during the course of those hearings. The right to
appear is rooted in the same fundamental human nature that compels us to
seek face-to-face encounters with adversaries or wielders of power or
money.161
The court has stated that the aggrieved party should normally “be
entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet, with the weapons of rebuttal
evidence, cross-examination, and argument, unfavorable evidence of
adjudicative facts.”162 Professor Larson agrees with Professors Pierce and
Davis about the need for formal hearings when adjudicating a workers’
entitlement to compensation under state law, stating:
160. Friendly, supra note 149, at 1282.
161. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017-18 (1988) (noting the core of the right to a fair
trial involves the right for the aggrieved to be present in person).
162. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Dorgan, 225 N.W.2d 278, 281 (N.D. 1974) (quoting
KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATE LAW TREATISE § 7.02, at 412 (1958)).
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Fair play rules include the right of cross-examination, rules against
ex-parte statements, necessity of having all evidence on the record,
and restrictions on determinations made by independent
investigation conducted by the tribunal. These rules are based on
fundamental notions of fairness. Nothing is more repugnant to our
traditions of justice than to be at the mercy of witnesses one cannot
see or challenge, or to have one’s rights stand or fall on the basis
of unrevealed facts that perhaps could be explained or refuted.163
While the nature of workers’ compensation proceedings “justify some
relaxation of strict rules of evidence”—e.g., medical records and physician
letters are normally admitted into evidence in compensation hearings—
“nevertheless it is fundamental that the right to confront witnesses, to crossexamine them, to refute them, and to have a record of their testimony must
be accorded unless waived.”164 These rules, “such as the right to crossexamine, are designed to guarantee the substantial rights of the parties and
are based on fundamental notions of fairness.”165
Wigmore has
characterized cross-examination as “beyond any doubt the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”166 Consistent with Judge
Friendly’s observation that while cross-examination can be overrated,167
nevertheless, cross-examination can be useful to elicit the IME examiner’s
assumptions that may not be based on the actual history. The Advisory
Committee on Proposed Rules of Evidence stated that cross-examination
has become a “vital feature” of our system “in exposing imperfections of
perception, memory, and narration . . . .”168
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held that where the important
property right in workers’ compensation benefits is at stake, claimants have
the right to cross-examine, at WSI’s expense, medical experts “whose
opinions [WSI] uses to refute the claimant’s treating physicians.” 169 The
court observed that when WSI obtains an IME to refute the treating
physician, and refuses cross-examination, “it effectively denies most
claimants a real opportunity to prove their entitlement to benefits. If [the
APA] is read to permit such a procedure, a potential due process violation
may exist.”170
163.
164.
165.
166.

7 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 127.11[3][a].
Torres v. Allen Family Foods, 672 A.2d 26, 31 (Del. 1995).
Id. at 32.
2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW 1697-98 (1904).
167. See Friendly, supra note 149, at 1284-85.
168. FED. R. EVID. art. VII introductory note.
169. Froysland v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 432 N.W.2d 883, 889 (N.D. 1988).
170. Id.
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As the North Dakota Supreme Court recognizes and Professor Larson
advocates, the Montana Supreme Court also held that fair play rules of due
process apply in workers’ compensation matters and “include the right of
cross-examination.”171 Moreover, the court quoted Professor Larson’s
similar heartfelt concern about the “increasingly common practice of
referral of claimant to an official medical examiner or an independent
physician chosen by the commission,” which made it “particularly
important that commissions not lose sight of the elementary requirement
that the parties be given an opportunity to see such a doctor’s report, crossexamine him, and if necessary provide rebuttal testimony.”172 The
Massachusetts Supreme Court was equally concerned about IMEs,
construing a statute that gave prima facie status to the report of the IME as
potentially facially unconstitutional unless construed to allow rebuttal and
cross-examination.173 The court noted that the statute authorized the ALJ to
order “the submission of additional medical testimony” and provided “an
opportunity for the claimant to put before the relevant decision makers
medical testimony she considers favorable to her claim,” and to crossexamine the IME examiner.174 As noted below however, WSI’s trial by
IME (whereby the treating doctor is not also deposed) has morphed this into
a WSI advantage—the IME is given the sole and final word. There seems
to be little question that a dispute resolution mechanism devoid of any of
the various protections to a fair process violates the Constitution.
C. DUCKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION—IMPROPERLY
INVOKING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
The Jassek court, however, avoided the constitutional question,
deciding instead that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case,
because his medical provider has signed Jassek’s request for review.175 The
court reached this conclusion on its own, as the issue was never raised by
the parties, and even though WSI had agreed the request had been filed “for

171. Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum, 530 P.2d 433, 436-37 (Mont. 1975) (quoting 7
LARSON, supra note 7, at § 127.05[4]).
172. Id. (quoting 7 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 127.05[4]). See also Baros v. Wyoming,
834 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Wyo. 1992) (recognizing “the majority rule that medical reports in a written
form are admissible so long as the elementary fair-play requirements of notice, timely furnishing
of copies, and the right of cross-examination if requested, are observed.”).
173. O’Brien’s Case, 673 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Mass. 1996).
174. Id. at 570-71.
175. Jassek v. N.D. Workforrce Safety and Ins., 2013 ND 69, ¶¶ 6-8, 830 N.W.2d 582, 58485.
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Michael Jassek” and which WSI considered “their BDR request.”176 Jassek
was pro se at that point and relied upon WSI’s representation that he was
party to the appeal. Citing Carroll v North Dakota Workforce Safety &
Insurance,177—a case in which the employee had not filed a timely
appeal178—the court dismissed Jassek’s appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because he had not personally signed the review petition.179
Jassek is out of step with the governing statutes and cases decided by
the court in other matters, such as probate. North Dakota Century Code
section 28-32-01(8) defines a party as “each person named or admitted as a
party or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a
party.”180 Whether an individual is party to the BDR depends on more than
the accident as to who files the BDR petition. WSI was correct that given
its representations, Jassek was a party to the BDR under the law and that
Jassek, as the aggrieved party, was properly party to the appeal under North
Dakota Century Code section 65-02-20.
While courts have sometimes characterized a failure to satisfy certain
procedural requirements before filing suit or taking of an appeal as lacking
subject matter jurisdiction, many legal scholars, such as the renowned
Professor Robert J. Martineau,181 have joined Professor Larson in criticizing
the lax use of the concept.182 Professor Martineau notes that while courts
have little difficulty in agreeing on an abstract definition of subject matter
jurisdiction, “the difficulty comes when appellate courts apply the
definition or, ignoring the definition, characterize other defects in the
proceeding as the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in order to permit a
belated attack.”183 For example, Professor Martineau explores Mesolella v.
City of Providence,184 wherein the Supreme Court of Rhode Island

176. Brief for Appellee at ¶ 20, Jassek v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2013 ND 69, 830
N.W.2d 582 (emphasis added) (“Therefore, WSI did consider Jassek to be a party to and a
participant in the request for binding dispute resolution.”).
177. 2008 ND 139, 752 N.W.2d 188.
178. Jassek, ¶ 11, 830 N.W.2d at 585.
179. Id. ¶¶ 8-11.
180. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-32-01(8) (2013) (emphasis added).
181. Professor Martineau, a Distinguished Research Professor of Law at the University of
Cincinnati, is the author of two casebooks on appellate practice.
182. See Robert J. Martineau, Subject Matter Jurisdiction as a New Issue on Appeal:
Reining in an Unruly Horse, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998). As Professor Martineau argues,
“[a]llowing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction to be raised for the first time on appeal has
enormous implications for the parties to a legal proceeding, the trial and appellate courts, and the
proper functioning of a judicial system.” Id. Professor Martineau notes that cases can be litigated
for years, and if subject matter jurisdiction may be first raised on appeal to the supreme court, “the
waste of private and public resources is enormous.” Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 8 (discussing Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 666 (R.I. 1986)).
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distinguished between procedural requirements for filing an action and
subject matter jurisdiction,185 as courts often “confused the lack of
jurisdiction over a particular action for failure to comply with the conditions
precedent with a lack of jurisdiction over the class of cases to which that
action belongs.”186
The real question posed in Jassek was not one of subject matter
jurisdiction. According to Professor Martineau, “procedural obligations
placed on a party to initiate an action . . . should not be treated as a
limitation on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”187 Martineau explains
that subject matter jurisdiction goes to the type of case the court can hear,
not what a party must do to invoke it. This should not be confused with the
procedural obligations, for “if this were not the case, the anomalous
situation would be created in which subject matter jurisdiction would be
dependent upon the actions of a party, exactly the opposite of the principle
that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties.” 188
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held
that a jurisdictional error failing to join the United States as a party did not
make the judgment void.189 Since the issue in Jassek was not a question of
subject matter jurisdiction, the issue regarding the procedural obligation of
the party to initiate the action should not have been allowed to be raised for
the first time on appeal. There is no question but that as to subject matter
jurisdiction, the court had jurisdiction over this “class of case”—BDR
disputes.190 Hopefully, Mr. Jassek will be the last pro se injured worker
denied his day in court by the erroneous use of subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. DISABILITY
Disability is defined as the loss of earnings capacity—the inability to
obtain or perform employment due to injury.191 There are different
185. Id.
186. The Mesolella court noted the confusing use of the word jurisdictional, holding that
failure to comply with a procedural notice requirement does not divest a court of subject matter
jurisdiction. Mesolella, 508 A.2d at 665. Because the lack of proper notice defense does not go
to subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot be raised belatedly. Id.
187. Martineau, supra note 182, at 23.
188. Id. at 23-24.
189. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624 F.2d 824, 825 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980).
190. See Olson v. Estate of Rustad, 2013 ND 83, ¶ 19, 831 N.W.2d 369, 378 (the court had
subject matter jurisdiction because it “had the power to hear and determine the general subject
involved in the action”) (emphasis added)).
191. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(14) (2013). See also Rodenbiker v. Workforce Safety
and Ins., 2007 ND 169, ¶ 18, 740 N.W.2d 831, 835 (defining disability as the inability to “perform
or obtain any substantial amount of labor in his particular line of work, or in any other for which
he would be fitted.”) (emphasis added).
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eligibility standards for disability on initial application, and on reapplication
for disability benefits.192 As argued in subsection A below, North Dakota
law is profoundly mistaken in determining eligibility for disability benefits
on reapplication, which has recently been applied to end disability
eligibility to disabled prisoners on release. Part B discusses employer
transitional job offers that are often a subterfuge to end disability benefits.
Part C argues that the vocational rehabilitation chapter to determine post
injury earnings capacity has devolved to a termination statute, given WSI’s
continued use of one size fits all vocational plans for return to work in the
same generic jobs. Part D discusses the inability of many workers to
remain in compliance with onerous work search for entry level jobs they are
not interested in, have no aptitude or skills for, and are unlikely to obtain,
resulting in benefit termination for noncompliance. Part E sets out the
plight of the elderly disabled, many of whom are reduced to penury in their
golden years by various retirement offsets. Part F addresses the simple
need for the employee to prove a causal relationship between injury and
disability and WSI’s refusal to apply prior precedent of the North Dakota
Supreme Court.
A. THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF
ACTUAL WAGE LOSS IN DETERMINING DISABILITY ON
REAPPLICATION IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH BASIC
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES
Claimant’s attorneys have long been troubled by the harsh construction
of the reapplication statute, North Dakota Century Code section 65-0508(1), which requires proof of a “significant change in the compensable
medical condition” and “actual wage loss,” prior to reinstatement of
disability benefits.193
The 2013 Legislature demonstrated a basic
misunderstanding of workers’ compensation law in a “housekeeping bill,”
applying the reapplication statute to inmates so as to effectively preclude
disabled inmates from entitlement to disability benefits on release from
incarceration.194 Prior to the amendments, North Dakota Century Code
section 65-05-08(2) provided that disability benefits must be suspended
during the period of incarceration but must also be reinstated upon release if

192. If disability benefits are paid and discontinued, additional disability benefits may be
paid on reapplication only on proof that the employee has sustained: (a) a significant change in
the compensable medical condition; (b) actual wage loss; and (c) the employee has not withdrawn
from the job market. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(1) (2013).
193. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(1) (2013).
194. H.B. 1080 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).

2013]

BROKEN PROMISE

647

otherwise entitled.195 The crafty amendments are disguised to look as
though there is no substantive change, providing that “[a]ll payments of
disability and rehabilitation benefits of any employee who is eligible for, or
receiving, benefits under this title must be discontinued when the employee
is confined . . . in excess of hundred and eighty consecutive days.”196 WSI
characterized the bill as housekeeping, and did not explain the effect.197
To understand the effect of the legislation, one must understand that a
much harsher standard for entitlement to disability applies in an application
for reinstatement after benefits had been discontinued under the
reapplication statute, North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(1).198

195. This provision formerly provided that payments of disability and rehabilitation must be
suspended during the period of confinement over seventy hours, but reinstated if the disability
remained at the time of release from incarceration. N.D. Cent. Code § 65-05-08(2) (2011).
196. H.B. 1080 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (emphasis added).
197. See Hearing on H.B. 1080 Before the S. Comm. on Indus., Bus., and Labor, 63d Leg.
Sess., Reg. Assemb. 17 (N.D. 2013) (testimony of Tim Wahlin) (confirming Senator Klein’s
indication that “this is the annual WSI cleanup bill.”). WSI counsel, Jodi Bjornson, provided a
written explanation of section five in her January 14, 2013 handout that does not reveal the effect
of the amendment on the incarcerated:
Section 5. This section of the bill proposes to change how disability benefits are
restarted after an injured employee is released from incarceration. Currently, if an
injured employee who is receiving disability benefits becomes incarcerated for more
than seventy-two consecutive hours, disability benefits are suspended. Upon release,
the disability benefits are immediately reinstated regardless of the length of
incarceration. So, for example, if an injured employee has been in the penitentiary for
ten years, their disability benefits restart as soon as they are let out without any
explanation or reapplication process. The proposed change would create a tiered
process so that if an injured employee is jailed for a period between seventy-two
consecutive hours and thirty consecutive days, disability benefits would be
immediately restarted. But, if an injured employee spends more than thirty
consecutive days in jail, he or she would be required to reapply just as any other
injured worker, before receiving disability benefits again.
Id. at 42 (written testimony of Jodi Bjornson) (emphasis added). At the February 19, 2013
hearing, it was pointed out that the legislation would make it impossible for those incarcerated to
be eligible for reinstatement. See id. at 19 (testimony of Dean Haas). In reply, Ms. Bjornson said
that under the case law, an injured worker who shows that a good faith work search failed due to
injury might be entitled to reinstatement of disability. Id. at 20 (testimony of Jodi Bjornson). This
is false; the court has precluded this argument. See, e.g., Johnson v. N.D. Workforce Safety &
Ins., 2010 ND 198, ¶ 20, 789 N.W.2d 565, 570. WSI also left the impression with the Legislature
that an individual incarcerated for a lengthy period—its example was ten years—was, absent the
sought for amendment to the law, automatically entitled to immediate reinstatement on release.
See id. at 42 (testimony of Jodi Bjornson). This is also untrue. Disability benefits are always
conditioned on the claimant’s medical status, and if the inmate had recovered in this ten-year
period, no disability would be paid. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08.1 (2013) (requiring a
claimant to submit medical verification of disability). Furthermore, WSI has continuing
jurisdiction to determine disability status on the merits. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-04 (2013).
Thus, none of the purported justifications for the amendment are real. Punishing prisoners a
second time by precluding reinstatement of disability on release from prison is poor public policy.
198. This section provides that once disability benefits are “discontinued,” WSI may
reinstate disability only upon written reapplication by the employee, with proof that the employee
sustained a significant change in the compensable medical condition and actual wage loss caused
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H.B. 1080 requires employees whose disability benefits are discontinued
upon incarceration to reapply for benefits under North Dakota Century
Code section 65-05-08(1). WSI testified before the Legislature that those
employees whose benefits were previously suspended upon incarceration
should not be automatically placed back on disability on release from jail,
but should be required to “re-apply like everyone else.”199 WSI did not tell
the Legislature that the change in language brings into play the
reapplication statute, and did not explain the significant difference between
initial applications for disability, and reapplications under North Dakota
Century Code section 65-05-08(1), which requires not only a “significant
change in the compensable medical condition,” but also “actual wage
loss.”200
Unlike most employees whose benefits are discontinued, those whose
benefits are suspended upon incarceration were not released for work, for if
they had been, disability would have terminated on the merits. These
individuals are sentenced to incarceration while still disabled. So, on
release, it is almost impossible to show a change in medical condition.
How does one prove that a disabling condition is even more disabling?
And what would be the point? Either one is disabled, or not.201
Most crucially, the reapplication statute requires proof of “actual wage
loss.” While WSI intimated to the Legislature that actual wage loss might
be shown by an unsuccessful job search, the court has made it clear that
“actual wage loss” requires proof of loss of wage income from a job
actually held by the employee contemporaneously with the change in
condition.202 Loss of an actual job should not be required to prove
disability. After all, disability is defined as the inability to “perform or
obtain any substantial amount of labor in his particular line of work, or in
by the significant change in the compensable medical condition. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(1)
(2013).
199. See Hearing on H.B. 1080, supra note 197, at 42 (testimony of Jodi Bjornson); id. at 23
(testimony of Bryan Klipfel) (explaining that “the reason they looked at changing the law was a
fairness issue. If you are incarcerated for a long period of time and all you have to do is come out
an reapply for your benefits, where if it is anybody else with discontinuance of their benefits they
have to go through the reapplication process.”).
200. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(1) (2013).
201. Contrary to any concern that a disability might be cured while the individual is
incarcerated, a simple release from incarceration does not result in automatic reinstatement on
release without any examination of the merits. Reinstatement of disability to those released from
incarceration would be determined as is any initial claim for disability. If the disability ends, so
do payments. So, if an employee released from jail improves so as to be able to work, WSI can
terminate disability benefits on the merits; after all, North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-04
grants WSI continuing jurisdiction to determine disability status. H.B. 1080 was not needed to
accomplish this sensible result.
202. See Gronfur v. N.D. Workers Comp. Fund, 2003 ND 42, ¶¶ 14-15, 658 N.W.2d 337,
343.
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any other for which he would be fitted,”203 and so measures loss of earnings
capacity. Unfortunately, this is not the rule in reapplications. It should be.
The court’s interpretation of the reapplication statute is little understood,
and its harsh consequences long ignored. H.B. 1080 provided an
opportunity to revisit this issue, which the Legislature, with the obfuscation
of WSI, declined to take. The issue deserves much more attention than it
has received.
The reapplication statute was introduced due to the difficulty of closing
disability claims, which occurs for many reasons. First, after Buechler v.
North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau204 was decided, the
schedule award for a permanent partial disability then governed by the now
repealed North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-12 could no longer be
used to close partial disability claims.205 The Buechler court interpreted the
permanent partial disability award as an add-on benefit to compensate for
“impairment.”206 Schedule awards had been serving as prima facie
evidence of the partial disability (loss of earnings capacity). In other
words, the schedule award under North Dakota Century Code section 6505-12 for partial disability (not total disability) had allowed claims closure
based on a presumed wage loss element.207 The Legislature subsequently

203. Jimison v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 331 N.W.2d 822, 827 (N.D. 1983)
(emphasis added).
204. 222 N.W.2d 858 (N.D. 1974).
205. Permanent partial disability schedule awards are based on medical condition after
maximum medical improvement and while paid without regard to proof of wage loss, yet were
based on wage loss principles, as they were intended as presumptive evidence of wage loss. 4
LARSON, supra note 7, at § 80.04. This meant that an employee, for example, who lost an eye, but
was able to return to work at his or her regular wage is nevertheless entitled to the schedule
permanent partial disability award. Id. But this cuts both ways. “Conversely, if the workers’
[schedule] benefits expire, and he or she remains [unable to work] because of disability,” the
benefits still stop when the scheduled number of weeks runs out. Id. at § 80.05[4]. The North
Dakota permanent partial disability schedule award had been serving this basic purpose, and
allowed for claims closure. Larson went on to explain that the wage loss principle became
gradually distorted, observing that “[w]hen a system, all of whose features are keyed to a wageloss function, is changed, whether absentmindedly or deliberately, into a physical impairment
system, with no corresponding adjustment of these wage-loss-related features, there is bound to be
trouble.” Id. at § 80.05[3].
206. Buechler, 222 N.W.2d at 861. Larson notes that several states came to embrace the
physical impairment theory under which schedule awards are always add-on awards, and never
used as presumptive evidence of earnings loss to close a disability claim. Minnesota accomplished
this by statute in 1974. 4 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 80.05[7]. “In addition, several states have
judicially broken ranks. North Dakota was the first, holding in 1974 that both a permanent total
and a permanent partial (‘22% disability of the whole man’) award could be made for the same
back injury—a result that can only be explained by assuming it to be based on a theory that the
former is for loss of earning capacity and the latter for physical impairment.” Id.
207. Of the Buechler opinion, Larson notes:
It is significant that the court, apart from a couple of generalizations, was unable to
cite a single case from another jurisdiction reaching the same result, although the
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amended North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-12 to refer to
impairment, and these awards were no longer a schedule injury for
presumed wage loss.208
The second reason that claims became more difficult to close is an
equally involved story. The agency had also been operating under a
profound misunderstanding of the effect of a simple discontinuation of
disability benefits, believing that any work release and termination of
disability benefits was final, and could not be reopened. For example, an
employee might be released to heavy work, and benefits discontinued.
Later, the employee might have a change in condition and be given a light
work release only. If the employee had skills only to do heavy work, he or
she might now be unable to work. Yet, WSI was claiming that disability
could not be reopened. WSI claimed that reopening was purely
discretionary, and its earlier determination of disability was res judicata.
The agency relied on Jones v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation
Bureau209 for the proposition that once it discontinued benefits the
disability determination became final. But that case is inapposite because
Jones did not involve disability, which can change over time. Rather, Jones
had to do with the causal relationship between the injury and the
condition.210 A decision on cause is something that can be—and should
be—finally decided and not continually reopened.
The doctrine of res judicata does not apply with equal force to
disability determinations because the ability to work can change over time.
A WSI decision is res judicata as to the worker’s disability status as it then
exists. The court in Lass v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation
Bureau211 observed that disability determinations must be reconsidered
based on change in condition. This, the court said “is a recognition of the
obvious fact that, no matter how competent a commission’s diagnosis of
claimant’s condition and earning prospects at the time of hearing may be,
that condition may later change markedly for the worse, or may improve, or
may even clear up altogether.”212
With the questionable end of claims closure under Buechler, but the
spot-on Lass holding, WSI lost the ability to close disability claims.
North Dakota statute is of a routine type, and although the combination of permanent
total and permanent partial occurs thousands of times every year.
Id. at § 80.05[7] n.63.
208. See Kroeplin v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 415 N.W.2d 807, 809-10 (N.D.
1987).
209. 334 N.W.2d 188, 191 (N.D. 1983).
210. Id. at 189.
211. 415 N.W.2d 796, 800 (N.D. 1987).
212. Id. at 800 (quoting 3 LARSON’S WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW § 81.10 (1983)).
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Adjusters at the time of the Lass decision called these re-openings “vault
crawlers” because a claim with no activity and stored in the vault might be
reactivated by a claimant who provided medical records showing disability,
often dating back months or even years. Clearly, something had to be done.
WSI submitted legislation to enact the reapplication criteria in North
Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(1) and also a new invention, the
vocational rehabilitation chapter, North Dakota Century Code chapter 6505.1, largely modeled on the Montana Act.213 The rehabilitation statutes
also allow for claims closure, based on a retained earnings capacity.
Because there was no procedure to limit vault crawling, some form of
reapplication procedure was clearly needed. Primarily, the employee would
have to prove his medical condition changed, and that due to this change, he
or she had lost a significant ability to earn an income from work. But the
Gronfur court’s interpretation of the meaning of “actual wage loss” as loss
of actual wage income was not expected, as it is contrary to the very
definition of disability, which is loss of earnings capacity.214
The Bureau’s initial view (for the first 10 years after the statute was
enacted) was that the term “actual wage loss” meant what the dissent in
Gronfur claims: that the inability to obtain employment due to injury is
sufficient to show loss of his or her ability to work for a living.215 The
words “actual wage loss” do not have the talismanic significance the North
Dakota Supreme Court gave them in Gronfur and its progeny.216
Employees have actually lost income if their injury alone precludes them
from obtaining or performing employment. The court does not appear to
express any surprise that this trio of cases first raised this issue over ten
years after enactment, nor does the record appear to reflect WSI’s altered
construction of the statute.
213. See MONT. CODE ANN. ch. 59-71 (2013). The Montana Supreme Court has noted that
the rehabilitation chapter is intended to return employees to work and assist them “in acquiring
skills or aptitudes to return to work” to “reasonably reduce the worker’s actual wage loss.”
Caldwell v. MACo Workers Comp. Trust, 256 P.3d 923, 928 (Mont. 2011) (emphasis added).
Just as North Dakota utilized the term “actual wage loss” in North Dakota Century Code section
65-05-08(1) to determine eligibility for disability on reapplication, Montana used “actual wage
loss” to determine eligibility for vocational rehabilitation. Obviously, Montana got it right in not
requiring loss of an actual job to qualify for rehabilitation. Rather, Montana law defines “actual
wage loss” as “wages a worker earns or is qualified to earn after the worker reaches maximum
healing are less than the actual wages the worker received at the time of the injury.” MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-71-116 (2013). Clearly, Montana recognizes that “actual wage loss” means loss of
earnings capacity. That the North Dakota vocational rehabilitation was based on Montana law is
also highly persuasive that the Gronfur court got it wrong.
214. See Gronfur v. N.D. Workers Comp. Fund, 2003 ND 42, ¶¶ 14-15, 658 N.W.2d 337,
345.
215. Id. ¶¶ 17-21, 658 N.W.2d at 343-44 (Maring J., dissenting).
216. See Bachmeier v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2003 ND 63, ¶ 16, 660 N.W.2d 217,
222; Lesmeister v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 2003 ND 60, ¶ 24, 659 N.W.2d 350, 358.
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To recap, the Gronfur court upheld the denial of disability despite the
undisputed nature of the disability that accompanied Mr. Gronfur’s
surgery,217 simply because the legislature used the term “actual wage loss”
in North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(1)(b), rather than the more
expansive term “earnings capacity.”218 This proved to the court that if a
worker was not actually working prior to filing the reapplication, no
benefits could be paid.219 The court thereby reverses the basic principle in
Lass that since disability may change over time, prior determinations should
not bind future decision-makers on new facts regarding disability status.
Moreover Gronfur is premised on a misunderstanding of basic
compensation principles. The court, quoting Professor Larson, noted
Degree of disability is calculated under most acts by comparing
actual earnings before the injury with earning capacity after the
injury. It is at once apparent that the two items in the comparison
are not quite the same. Actual earnings are a relatively concrete
quantity . . . . Earning capacity, however, is a more theoretical
concept. It obviously does not mean actual earnings, since the
legislature deliberately chose a different phrase for the post-injury
earnings factor.220
This is absolutely true. The court fails to note the most crucial fact:
that actual wage income is used to calculate and determine the initial
disability award—which is two-thirds of the employee’s actual wages at the
date of injury.221 Actual wages determine the weekly compensation rate.
On the other hand, “earnings capacity” is used to ascertain whether the
employee lost or retains the ability to earn a living post injury: thus, no
state other than North Dakota—and even then only in reapplication
scenarios222—uses actual wages earned post injury to forever determine loss
217. An examination of the facts in Gronfur is enlightening. Gronfur injured his back in
1996 and received disability benefits for a short time. Gronfour, ¶ 2, 658 N.W.2d at 339. In 1997,
the Bureau terminated total disability benefits but awarded temporary disability benefits, claiming
he could do light work. Id. He did not appeal, and the order became final. Id. He reapplied in
2000, claiming that his back condition had worsened. Id. ¶ 3. In fact, Gronfur had back surgery,
which was, as a matter of medical fact, disabling. Id. The Bureau denied his reapplication
because he had not established “actual wage loss.” Id. at 340. In fact, Gronfur had not worked
since 1996. Id.
218. Id. ¶ 3, 658 N.W.2d at 342-43.
219. Id. ¶ 15, 658 N.W.2d at 343.
220. Id. ¶ 13, 658 N.W.2d at 342 (quoting 4 LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPESNATION LAW §
81.01).
221. 4 Larson, supra note 7, at § 81.01[1]. As to the calculation to determine the
employee’s actual wage at the time of injury on which to base benefits, see id. at §§ 93.01-93.06.
222. Other than in reapplications, North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-10 conditions
partial disability awards on loss of “wage-earning capacity.” Generally, “[t]he employee’s
earnings capacity may be established by expert vocational evidence of a capacity to earn in the
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of this earnings capacity.223 The Legislature’s skepticism that post injury
actual wage income truly reflects the loss of earnings capacity is starkly
illustrated by North Dakota Century Code chapter 65-05.1. There, the
Legislature created a “waste basket” presumption that the employee retains
some earning capacity to reduce entitlement to total disability even when
none of the priority options in North Dakota Century Code chapter 65-05.1
apply.224 Actual wage income is not generally used to determine
entitlement to partial disability after the employee finishes vocational
training either; rather benefits are paid based upon the difference between
pre-injury actual wage income and the higher of the actual post injury
earnings or “the employee’s wage-earning capacity” after vocational
retraining is completed.225
The Gronfur court’s cite to Larson’s Workers Compensation treatise as
supportive is incorrect, as the quote is taken out of context. Larson shows
that the difference between use of the terms “actual wages” and “earnings
capacity” is because the former is used only to determine pre-injury wage
basis and the latter to determine post injury income loss. Professor Larson
explains why it is important to focus on the more expansive concept of
“earnings capacity” post-injury:
In essence, the problem is one of tying earnings to a period of
time. The relevant period of time for prior earnings can be made
relatively short and definite, such as the six months [or one year]
preceding the accident. Once an arbitrary past period is specified
as setting the basis for computing an average weekly wage, there
can be little argument about what wages were in fact earned. But
the relevant period for post-injury earnings melts away into the
indefinite future. Obviously we cannot take an arbitrary period of,
say, six months after the injury as conclusive, since for a multitude
of reasons that period might be entirely nonrepresentative. On the
statewide job pool where the worker lives.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10(3) (2013). While
actual post injury earnings are presumptive evidence of earnings capacity, this is strictly limited to
circumstances where the employee found full time work and in a job related to the employee’s
transferable skills. Id. Moreover, the presumption to use actual wage income is rebuttable. Also
consistent with the emphasis on earnings capacity post injury, the vocational rehabilitation
chapter clearly conditions continuing disability awards and awards of vocational training on loss
of earnings capacity. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-04(4) (2013). There is absolutely no
compensation principle to justify using anything other than loss of earnings capacity to determine
an employee’s eligibility for benefits when he or she reapplies due to a significant change in
medical or vocational circumstance.
223. 4 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 81.07.
224. North Dakota law provides that if none of the priority options are viable, the employee
must continue to seek work or be subject to termination for noncompliance. N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-05.1-01(6)(a) (2013).
225. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-06.1(2)(i)(2) (2013).
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other hand, we cannot wait out the rest of claimant’s life to see
what his or her average weekly wage loss ultimately turned out to
be. The normal solution is to make the best possible estimate of
future impairment of earnings, on the strength not only of actual
post-injury earnings but of any other available clues.226
Clearly, in determining the employee’s lifetime loss of income, the
employee’s actual post-injury earnings are wholly inadequate in
determining the lifelong loss of the income stream the worker could have
earned but for the injury.227 Actual wages are not the measure of this loss;
loss of earnings capacity is.
Thus, Larson notes that every Workers Compensation Act focuses on
the employee’s “retained earnings capacity” rather than actual post-injury
earnings in determining the disability award (as opposed to pre-injury
actual wages that set the amount of the weekly disability check). This focus
on retained earnings capacity is essential because injured workers
frequently find themselves at a considerable disadvantage in obtaining
employment after released to do some kind of work, most often of a kind
the worker had never performed before, as they go from performing heavy
labor to light work only. Since, as the Gronfur Court held, “actual wage
loss,” means the loss of a job, the State turns its back on injured employees
whose injury is the primary reason they cannot obtain work.
The extremely harsh construction of the reapplication statute should be
ameliorated by allowing an employee eligibility for reopening of disability
under North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-04(4). This would still
require the employee to show not only a change in medical condition, but
also a diligent work search that was unsuccessful due to the injury. In other
words, the employee would have to prove that he or she had not just
lounged on the couch, but was beating the pavement hard for work, and was
unable to obtain any employment because of the injury. WSI counsel’s
testimony at the hearing on H.B. 1080 indicated that WSI might agree that
this is a desirable approach.228
But as is its predilection, WSI did not inform the committee that the
North Dakota Supreme Court has unfortunately precluded this argument in
Johnson v. North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance.229 The court’s
summary dismissal of the argument is superficial and disheartening:

226.
227.
228.
229.

4 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 81.01[1].
Id.
See Hearing on H.B. 1080, supra note 197, at 2-8 (testimony of Jodi Bjornson).
2010 ND 198, 789 N.W.2d 565.
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Johnson argues, however, he was not required to reapply for
disability benefits under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08(1), because he made
a series of good-faith work trials and was entitled to reinstatement
of disability benefits and a reassessment of his reasonable options
for reemployment under N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-04(4). However,
N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-04(4) falls within the statutory chapter
addressing vocational rehabilitation services, and applies only after
there has been a determination of the first appropriate
rehabilitation option under N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-01(4). Here
vocational rehabilitation services were not initiated under
N.D.C.C. ch. 65-05.1, and WSI did not make a determination of
Johnson’s first appropriate rehabilitation option. We therefore
conclude N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-04(4) does not apply, and we reject
Johnson’s attempt to circumvent the reapplication requirements
under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08(1) for reinstatement of disability
benefits.230
Based on WSI’s representations to the Legislature that an inmate’s
disability benefits might be resumed “if you can show that you tried to seek
work and you couldn’t because of your disability,”231 an inmate on release
must be deemed to have requested rehabilitation services under North
Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(8)(b).232
This would
acknowledge that any informed employee would request rehabilitation
services to meet the Johnson exception so as to allow for reinstatement
upon proof a good faith work search failed due to injury under North
Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-04(4). In pending litigation however,
WSI now pretends as though it had not made this representation to the
legislature, contending that job search evidence is irrelevant and that the
inmate on release must show a significant change in medical condition and
actual wage loss, rather than an inability to obtain work evidenced by
unsuccessful job search.233
The Legislature should amend the reapplication statute to provide that
benefits must be reinstated on proof of a significant change in medical
condition, and “loss of earnings capacity.” If WSI’s opinions are as they
230. Id. ¶ 20, 789 N.W.2d at 570.
231. See Hearing on H.B. 1080, supra note 197, at 20 (testimony of Jodi Bjornson).
232. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(8) (2013) (allowing either WSI or an employee to
initiate vocational rehabilitation services).
233. In an unreported case, Miller v. North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance, decided
by an ALJ on other grounds, WSI rejected the argument that under its representations to the
Legislature, it must deem the inmate to have requested initiation of vocational services to avoid
the harsh result in Johnson v. North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance, 2010 ND 198, ¶ 20,
789 N.W.2d 565 (materials in possession of author).
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were represented to the Senate Industry, Business and Labor Committee as
the legislature considered H.B. 1080, the agency should support an
amendment to allow disability benefits on reapplication under North Dakota
Century Code section 65-05-08(1)(b) on proof of loss of earnings
capacity—as in a failed job search. Reapplications will still be subject to
strict criteria of both a substantial change in medical and vocational
circumstance.
Unfortunately, as the Legislature ostensibly considered WSI’s bill to
apply the actual wage loss requirement to prisoners on release from
incarceration, the committee did not seize the opportunity to understand the
harsh application of the reapplication statute. Rather, the Legislature
granted WSI’s sought amendment to preclude incarcerated employees from
ever being able to meet the exacting standard for reinstatement of disability
benefits on release from prison. Even if there is little sympathy for those
who offend society by committing a crime, society as whole surely does not
benefit by adding a punishment under the Workers’ Compensation
statutes.234
As one commentator persuasively argues, because
uncompensated injuries contribute to recidivism, society suffers not only
property and health loss, but also the loss of a future taxpayer.235 And even
if one ignores the public policy problem of transferring the economic losses
to other governmental and charitable entities that often cannot fill the void,
there must be some sympathy for the innocent dependents of the released
inmate.
The court’s construction of the reapplication statute is harsh, and
offends basic workers’ compensation principles. The interpretation of the
reapplication statute does not allow reinstatement on the same terms as
initial applications—the inability to obtain work—but rather requires the
employee to show he or she had a job at the time of reapplication. This
vicious circle precludes the employee from proving disability on reapplication for the very reason that he or she is disabled in the first place—
that the employee could not obtain the job that would have proved the
actual wage loss. So, on reapplication these employees find themselves
confronted with a paradoxical argument: the employee’s very disability that
WSI seeks to refute serves as a defense to WSI on reapplication.

234. See generally Steven A. Weiler, A Time for Recognition: Extending Workmen’s
Compensation Coverage to Inmates, 61 N.D. L. REV. 402 (1985).
235. Id. at 421-22. Weiler argues that five public policy considerations underlie the
extension of coverage to inmates: (1) economic; (2) justice and equity; (3) constitutional
guarantees; (4) reduction of recidivism; and (5) nonfault liability. Id. at 413.
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B. EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS AS SUBTERFUGE
TO TERMINATE DISABILITY
By requiring the loss of a job to prove actual wage loss on
reapplication, the court has largely reversed the Lass principle that a prior
disability determination should not be res judicata if the employee has
sustained a change in medical and vocational circumstances.236
Interestingly, while an employee is no longer allowed to prove that his or
her failure to obtain work despite a good-faith work search constitutes a
significant change in vocational circumstances (to avoid the prior
termination of disability being given res judicata effect), an employee fired
for cause may be entitled to reinstatement. An employee fired for cause
need not show actual wage loss, but may instead prove that after the
termination he made a good faith job search and was unable to obtain work
due to the work injury.237 It is odd, indeed, that an employee terminated for
cause has a better opportunity for reinstatement based on a failed job search
than do blameless employees who suffer a change in medical condition and
cannot locate work.
Claimants’ advocates have observed employers coordinating a strategy
with WSI to terminate disability benefits—leaving most employees
ineligible for reinstatement. The common scenario is an employee with a
heavy work history who is now restricted to light duty only. If the
employee’s recovery and release to regular duty appears to be longer than is
customary to the injury, WSI and the employer are motivated to create a
transitional or modified job, which from the employee’s view may be
make-work. Once the physician confirms a work release, the employee is
obligated to engage a work trial or benefits are terminated.238 Shortly after
the transitional job begins, the make-work may end in frustration and
quitting, or the employer may subsequently fire the employee without
giving cause. The employee no longer has wage income, and by virtue of
disability benefits having been discontinued when the job trial began,
reinstatement under the reapplication statute becomes very unlikely.
Individuals coming to North Dakota for these great job opportunities
may soon find themselves abandoned after an injury occurs when they
236. While some may argue that the diagnosis must have changed, the change in medical
condition should be established by a change in the work restrictions. However, change in
vocational circumstances should be proved by the inability to obtain work due to injury as
demonstrated by failure of a good faith work search.
237. See Wendt v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 467 N.W. 2d 720, 727-28 (N.D. 1991)
(holding that a change in vocational circumstances can warrant reopening of the disability claim).
238. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08(7) (2013) (providing a defense to compensation if the
employee “voluntarily limits income or refuses to accept employment suitable to the employee’s
capacity, offered to or procured for the employee . . . .”).
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return home to rehabilitate. Some cannot find a physician in their home
state, but all whose disability benefits had been discontinued find that
reinstatement is nearly impossible because they are unable to locate work
again to establish actual wage loss. The brute fact is that many who come
here have a history of heavy work only and do not have the education or
skills to obtain or perform the light duty work they are restricted to
performing. Workers’ Compensation theory considers this proof of
disability. North Dakota may be the lone outlier.
C. EARNINGS CAPACITY UNDER THE VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION CHAPTER
While the vocational rehabilitation provisions found in North Dakota
Century Code chapter 65-05.1 correctly uses earnings capacity to determine
post injury awards, there continues to be significant limitations. North
Dakota law generally limits total disability benefits to two years239 and
partial disability benefits to five years.240 Although partial disability is also
limited to just one year if vocational training was awarded.241 However, if
the employee does not retain any earnings capacity, the partial disability
benefit will be equal to the total disability award.242 On its face, the
vocational rehabilitation scheme is a salutary effort to encourage return to
work as the first option,243 but if an employee is unable to return to her
former line of work or any other for which she is fitted, the chapter provides
vocational retraining.244 Vocational rehabilitation is awarded only when the
employee is unable to return to any “substantial gainful employment”

239. North Dakota law limits temporary total disability benefits to 104 weeks. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 65-01-02(29) (2013). This limit does not apply to permanent total disability, which is
narrowly defined by North Dakota Century Code section 65-01-02(25). See N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-01-02(25) (2013).
240. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-10(2) (2013).
241. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-06.1(2)(i)(4) (2013). The court has upheld this one-year
limit. See Eagle v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 154, ¶ 15, 583 N.W.2d 97, 102
(explaining that the legislative history for the reduction says “that benefits should be concentrated
in the area of the most need, and workers who have been retrained have received rehabilitation of
earnings as best the system can provide.”).
242. North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(6)(c) provides that if the employee
rebuts the presumption of a retained earnings capacity, “the employee may receive partial
disability benefits based on a retained earnings capacity of zero.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.101(6)(c) (2013).
243. North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(3) provides that it is the “goal of
vocational rehabilitation to return the disabled worker to substantial gainful employment with a
minimum of retraining, as soon as possible after an injury.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3)
(2013).
244. North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(4) provides a hierarchy of priority
options that returns the employee to substantial gainful employment (90% of the pre-injury wage).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(4) (2013).
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considering the employee’s education, experience, skills, and work
restrictions.245 Vocational rehabilitation is not available if an employee
retains an “earnings capacity” of 90% of her pre-injury wage or the capacity
to earn 66.67% percent of the state’s average weekly wage, whichever is
less.246 This is referred to as the “income test.” In the initial years after
enactment of this chapter, a significant number of workers were
rehabilitated through vocational rehabilitation. However, in recent years,
significantly fewer workers have received vocational rehabilitation
awards.247 The reduction in vocational rehabilitation awards has been
accomplished in two ways. First, the Legislature has consistently lowered
the income test. When enacted in 1989, vocational rehabilitation was
required if the workers did not retain the capacity to earn the lesser of their
entire pre-injury wage, or North Dakota’s average weekly wage, whichever
was lower. The Legislature reduced the income test in 1991 and again in
1995.248
The other reason that vocational rehabilitation awards have declined is
simply to reduce costs. As is the case in medical causation disputes,
vocational rehabilitation should hinge upon expert evaluation and
testimony, but the vocational consultants WSI hires in-house are
increasingly non-expert. In recent years, vocational consultants have
consistently identified low-wage, low-skilled, generic jobs as sufficient
employment for an injured worker—in one case finding a man who lost his
right arm did not require vocational rehabilitation because he could work
delivering pizzas.249 Given this predilection to manufacture an earnings
capacity based on make-work type jobs, the rehabilitation chapter could be
aptly called a termination statute.
245. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(3) (2013).
246. Id.
247. North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-02.1 requires WSI’s vocational consultant
to identify the “first appropriate rehabilitation option.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-02.1 (2013).
The consultant identifies a broad class of jobs she believes the employee can perform, along with
the anticipated retained earnings capacity. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-02.1(2)(a) (2013). In
most cases, WSI’s vocational consultant concludes that the employee is “employable” and retains
a “substantial earnings capacity,” thus disqualifying the worker from vocational retraining.
248. 1991 N.D. Laws 714, § 55 (reducing the income test to 75% of the state’s average
weekly wage); 1995 N.D. Laws 628, § 2 (reducing the income test to 66.66% of the state’s
average wage).
249. See for example Zimmerman v. Valdak Corp., in which the injured worker brought suit
against his employer, alleging an intentional tort. 1997 ND 203, 570 N.W.2d 204. The court
disallowed suit against the employer, holding that even gross negligence is insufficient to pierce
employer immunity, stating the intentional tort exception requires a genuine “intent to injure.” Id.
¶¶ 6-22, 570 N.W.2d at 205-09. The case is illustrative because the vast majority of cases have
upheld WSI’s determination that the employee can return to entry level work, based upon the ipse
dixit of WSI’s vocational consultant. Unfortunately, employees do not have the funds to hire their
own vocational experts to refute WSI’s consultant.
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In many states, the odd-lot doctrine protects the employee by shifting
the burden of proof to the compensation carrier where the medical
restrictions and limited vocational options are such as to render it
speculative the employee could find work. The odd-lot doctrine recognizes
that if an employee cannot return to any “well-known branch of the labor
market,” the burden must be on the employer. For an “unskilled or
common laborer,” who “couple[s] his request for employment with notice
that the labor must be light . . . is quickly put aside for more versatile
competitors. Business has little patience with the suitor for ease and favor.
He is the odd lot man . . . . Work, if he gets it, is likely to be casual and
intermittent.”250 North Dakota has not accepted the odd-lot doctrine, and in
fact reverses it. The rehabilitation statute provides that even if the
vocational consultant concludes that none of the priority options under are
viable, nevertheless the employee is required to “minimize the loss of
earnings capacity, to seek, obtain, and retain employment,” and that “an
employee is presumed to be capable of earning the . . . wages payable
within the appropriate labor market. This presumption is rebuttable only
upon a finding of clear and convincing medical and vocational evidence to
the contrary.”251
Under this reasoning, WSI can reduce benefits to everyone who gets
hurt, contending that injured North Dakotans should accept any trivial or
mundane employment. The unfairness of this system seems rather obvious;
an injured employee with a high school education, heavy-labor work
history, and few computer or customer service skills is surely at a
competitive disadvantage with a younger technologically literate competitor
for such work.
D. EMPLOYEES ARE MANEUVERED TO
VOCATIONAL NONCOMPLIANCE
Although a great number of injured workers have only high school
educations, low TABE (Test of Adult Basic Education) scores, a history of
only heavy manual labor, and few actual transferable skills allowing them
to compete for employment with a younger, computer-savvy, and ablebodied work force, WSI is likely to write a vocational plan for a return to an
occupation in the statewide job pool in generic jobs.252 WSI also writes
250.
1977).
251.
252.
statewide
skills.”).

Balczewski v. Dep’t of Indus., Labor, and Human Rights, 251 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Wis.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(6)(c) (2013).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(4)(f) (2013) (providing for return to work in the
job pool “which is suited to the employee’s education, experience, and marketable
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these vocational plans even when retraining would otherwise be a higher
vocational option, concluding—often without evidence—that the claimant
is not a vocational rehabilitation candidate.253 An employee is obligated by
law to conduct a good-faith work search to remain eligible for the reduced
partial disability benefits available due to an alleged retained earnings
capacity.254 Failure to conduct a work search results in termination.255
Even before the vocational plan is issued, WSI is likely to have required
employee participation in number of vocational tests and in remedial
education.256 For example, an employee with a heavy work history, low
grades in high school, poor TABE scores, and no ability to use a computer
is often found to have a retained earnings capacity in the entry-level jobs of
telephone solicitor and hotel clerk. These jobs require computer literacy.
Employees report that the computer training is very basic, providing no real
skills, but competency is assured by virtue of taking the same test until one
learns the correct answers and passes. The employee is thereby found to
have a retained earnings capacity in a job he really cannot do, but is
required to continue to search for work, day after day.
On its face, of course, the job search requirement makes eminent sense.
Yet, in practice, practitioners have noted WSI discounts job search via
perusal of want ads in the papers and at job service. Rather, WSI claims
that a good faith job search requires the employee to make five direct
employer contacts per day, such as cold-calling. The job search obligation
continues throughout the lifetime of the disability claim. After months of
rejection, few employees are able to maintain the eager motivation to
continue the pointless job search. Rather than provide real vocational
rehabilitation as North Dakota Century Code chapter 65-05.1 was designed
to do, WSI is able to gamble on noncompliance and win.

253. While North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(4)(g) provides for vocational
rehabilitation, WSI frequently skips the retraining option, instead applying the catch-all
requirement in North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-01(6) that requires all employees to
continue to “minimize the loss of earnings capacity, to seek, obtain, and retain employment.”
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-01(4)(g) (2013).
254. North Dakota Century Code sections 65-05.1-04(4) and (6) provide that the employee
is responsible to make a good-faith work search. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05.1-04(4), (6) (2013).
Under WSI’s interpretation of North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08(7), an employee is
obligated to accept even make work, as disability benefits are not payable if the employee
voluntarily limits income or refuses to accept suitable employment.
255. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.1-04(4) (2013).
256. North Dakota Century Code section 65-05.1-04(6) also requires participation in all
vocational testing and meetings with the vocational coordinator. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05.104(6) (2013).
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E. DISABILITY OF THE ELDERLY
North Dakota has also reduced disability benefits available to
employees who reach retirement age. While North Dakota had long offset
federal social security disability benefits,257 in 1989 it also began to offset
federal retirement benefits.258 Additionally, an injured employee who
receives social security retirement benefits or “attains retirement age for
social security retirement benefits” is presumed retired and ineligible for
disability benefits.259 If an employee is injured within two years of
reaching the presumed retirement age, disability is limited to an additional
two years.260 For those who continue working beyond retirement age and
are unfortunate enough to suffer an injury at work, the Legislature has
capped disability at three years.261 This ill-considered state policy ignores
the fact that many working people have not saved for retirement and depend
upon a paycheck long after they reach retirement age.
Two states, Utah and West Virginia, have questioned whether the state
legislature may constitutionally impose the cost of disability on the injured
worker rather than the workers’ compensation system for those over the
presumed retirement age.262 The Utah Supreme Court held that Utah’s
statutory scheme to certain individuals who qualified for both social
security retirement benefits and workers’ compensation benefits violates
Utah’s uniform operation of the law guarantee.263 The court did not find it
reasonable for the legislature to single out individuals for reduction of
disability benefits based on receipt of social security retirement:
“[p]resumably the legislature was attempting to account for the additional
income available to social security retirement recipients. But if income is
the criterion, there is no rational basis to rely only on income from a single
source.”264 The court would have concluded that the classification failed to
pass constitutional muster for that reason alone. Although the court noted
potential legitimate purposes: to prevent duplication of disability benefits;
257. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.1 (2013).
258. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.2 (2013).
259. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05-09.3(1), (2) (2013).
260. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.3(4) (2013).
261. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-09.3(3) (2013).
262. Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 223 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Utah 2009). See also State ex
rel. Boan v. Richardson, 482 S.E.2d 162, 168 (W.Va. 1996); but see Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 639
S.E.2d 866, 873-75 (W.Va. 2006) (“Workers’ compensation has never been intended to make the
employee whole-it excludes benefits for pain and suffering, for loss of consortium, and it provides
a cap on wage benefits . . . . Accordingly, we conclude that our isolated statement in Boan has
been implicitly modified by our subsequent rulings on this subject.”).
263. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Utah Court of Appeals, which had upheld the
statute. Merrill, 223 P.3d at 1091-92.
264. Id. at 1094.
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to reduce the cost of workers’ compensation for employers; and to and
restore solvency to the fund.265 It said that reducing the employer’s cost is
not a legitimate objective because the Workers Compensation Act “has
already limited the liability of employers” by limiting compensation to
injured employees to statutorily defined recoveries.266 But, the court said,
the legislature may be legitimately concerned to prevent duplication of
disability and to protect the fund’s solvency.267
Ultimately, the court turned to the crux of the matter: whether the
legislative classification bears a reasonable relationship to these legitimate
governmental purposes. The court said that the purpose of workers’
compensation is to provide an exclusive remedy for work injuries, which
places the burden of work injury on industry, where it belongs.268 The
purpose of social security, on the other hand, is to guarantee pension
income to the elderly, who had typically constituted an impoverished
group.269 Thus, the court said, social security and disability are not
duplicative of one another.270 Social security benefits are based upon
having worked and contributed to the fund for the requisite number of
quarters; disability benefits should be paid to any injured employee who
suffers a wage loss on account of a work-related injury.
Because the statutory schemes are not duplicative, the court said the
classification does not bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate purpose
of avoiding duplication of benefits.271 It also held that punishing injured
workers by reducing the degree to which they could be compensated for
proven wage loss “is not a rational response to the legislature’s concerns
about maintaining the solvency of the workers’ compensation fund . . . .”272
The court agreed with the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that
assuming receipt of social security benefits fully compensates a worker for
losses due to injury “raises a genuine issue whether the workers’
compensation scheme is an adequate substitute remedy.”273 The North
Dakota Supreme Court has declined to address the issue, finding that a
claimant failed to adequately brief her argument that the workers’

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
1996)).

Id. at 1094-95.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1095.
Id. at 1096.
Id. at 1096-98.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id. at 1097 (quoting State ex rel. Boan v. Richardson, 482 S.E.2d 162, 168 (W.Va.
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compensation statute setting forth the “retirement presumption” violated
equal protection guarantees of federal and state constitutions.274
F.

CAUSE OF DISABILITY

Just as an employment injury need not be the sole cause of injury, but
only a “substantial contributing factor” to an injury,275 the same rule applies
to disability. The North Dakota Supreme Court has long held that the
employee need not show the work injury is the sole or even primary cause
of disability, but a “substantial contributing factor.”276 Brockel v. North
Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance277 illustrates the Agency’s
predilection to obfuscate the legal issues. The court reversed WSI’s
termination of Brockel’s disability benefits rendered on the theory that,
while he continued to have work restrictions from his injury, the “primary
disabling factor” was a non-work-related vertebral artery occlusion that
could not be surgically corrected.278 Brockel requested a hearing, claiming
the legal error that violated the substantial contributing factor principle.279
At the hearing, WSI simply argued that the inability to surgically cure a
non-work disability ended WSI’s obligations to pay disability benefits.
WSI did not dispute that his work injury continued to carry a five-pound
lifting restriction, which the agency had deemed disabling, paying disability
benefits based on those work restrictions.280 Rather than decide whether the
inability to cure the work-related disability to his shoulder justified
termination of his disability as stated in the notice, the ALJ decided he
lacked medical verification of disability281 and that he was not “completely
274. Weeks v. N.D. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2011 ND 188, ¶ 13, 803 N.W.2d 601, 606.
275. Satrom v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 328 N.W.2d 824, 831 (N.D. 1982) (“If the
Bureau’s position is that Satrom’s injury must not only be causally related to her employment, but
that the employment must be the sole cause of her acute disc syndrome, we do not agree. It is
sufficient if the work-related stress is a ‘substantial contributing factor’ to the injury.”).
276. Holtz v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 479 N.W.2d 469, 471 (N.D. 1992) (citing
Satrom, 328 N.W.2d at 831).
277. 2014 ND 26, 843 N.W.2d 15.
278. Id. ¶¶ 19-21, 843 N.W.2d at 23-24. The court, noting that it had long held that a
claimant need not prove that the work-related injury is the sole cause or even primary cause of the
disability, but only that it be a “substantial contributing factor” to the disability, said “[c]learly, it
is work-related injury that is at the center of the legislature’s attention.” Id. ¶ 21, 843 N.W.2d at
24.
279. Id.
280. Id. ¶ 22. The court explained that the ALJ’s conclusion about his work injury is
“especially troubling” because “WSI had been paying Brockel disability benefits since the
accident” and no doctor had released Brockel to return to his former line of work, despite his
limitations and heavy work history. Id.
281. WSI’s Notice of Intent to Discontinue Disability Benefits did not advise Brockel that
benefits were terminated lacked medical verification of disability under North Dakota Century
Code section 65-05-08.1. WSI had never sought a new medical verification of disability from
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disabled,” which is not a defined term under the Act. The decision took no
cognizance of Brockel’s heavy work history and completely ignored the
vocational factors that make up every disability determination.282 The case
is illustrative of the agency’s win at all costs litigation posture, arguing a
legal theory on appeal that it had not proffered at the hearing.
V. WSI’S ADVERSARIAL LITIGATION STRATEGY
WSI’s litigation strategy relying on IMEs is in stark contrast to Satrom,
where the court undertook rigorous review and WSI relied on the treating
physician. WSI’s own medical director reported in 2012 that he had been
pressured to change his medical opinions283 and in 2014 that “the legal
process overrides medical opinions” in the review of injured worker’s
claims.284 WSI’s aggressive litigation posture and the poor compensation
for claimant’s counsel have created a dearth of attorneys practicing
workers’ compensation law. Claimants are losing access to counsel, which
absent systemic change in the system, will only worsen over time. It cannot
be contested that legal services have value; according to the Office of
Administrative Hearings, pro se claimants prevail about 19% of the time
and represented workers about 33% of the time.285
A. CLAIMANTS LACK ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL
The practice of workers’ compensation law is impeded not only by an
unnecessarily adversarial litigation strategy, but also by the fact that most
injured workers cannot afford to retain counsel, and WSI’s compensation of
Brockel as is required under the statute. See Frohlich v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 556
N.W.2d 297, 302 (N.D. 1996) (holding specific notice of intent to discontinue benefits for lack of
medical verification of disability is required); see also Flink v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1998
ND 11, 574 N.W.2d 784.
282. The court recognized that “[t]he ‘essence’ of the concept of disability under workers
compensation law is the ‘proper balancing of the medical and the wage-loss factors.’” Brockel, ¶
22, 843 N.W.2d at 24 (quoting 4 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 80.02). As Professor Larson explains:
The two ingredients usually occur together; but each may be found without the other.
A claimant may be, in a medical sense, utterly shattered and ruined, but may by sheer
determination and ingenuity contrive to make a living. Conversely, a claimant may be
able to work, in both the claimant’s and the doctor’s opinion, but awareness of the
injury may lead employers to refuse employment. These two illustrations will expose
at once the error that results from an uncompromising preoccupation with either the
medical or the actual wage-loss aspect of disability.
4 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 80.02.
283. Pat Springer, WSI doctor says he was pressured on claims, FARGO FORUM, Feb. 26,
2012, http://www.inforum.com/event/article/id/352186/.
284. Pat Springer, North Dakota workers’ comp doctor says opinions repeatedly bypassed,
FARGO
FORUM,
Mar.
16,
2014,
http://www.prairiebizmag.com/event/article/id/18387/group/Health%20Care/.
285. Letter from Allen C. Hoberg to Nancy J. Morris (Dec. 2, 2013) (on file with author).
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attorneys is exceedingly low. Additionally, WSI has recently announced its
intent to increase the hourly rate from $135 per hour to $140 per hour, with
accordingly miniscule changes to the caps on fees, which apply at every
stage of the proceeding, from hearing to appeal.286
Unfortunately, the court has upheld the sufficiency of whatever fee
caps WSI wishes to set.287 However, the majority noted that the claimant’s
attorney’s arguments “are perhaps valid criticisms of the attorney fee
payment scheme,”288 but upheld the rule under the extremely deferential
standard of review. The court acknowledged that:
The fee restrictions may discourage some attorneys from
representing workers compensation claimants. If that is the case,
they have identified a problem properly the concern of the
Legislature . . . . We offer no opinion on the wisdom of the
legislative mandate to the Bureau, but conclude only the record of
this rulemaking proceeding is adequate under the Act, and the
Bureau’s promulgation of the maximum hourly rate and the fee
caps was not an arbitrary or capricious application of its statutory
authority.289
Of course, WSI has the authority to change the caps to a reasonable
level, but has simply refused to exercise it, enjoying its significant resource
advantages. In reply to the proposed changes to the rates and caps,
claimants’ attorneys have noted that the new rate of $140 per hour is
certainly not competitive in the current legal environment. Moreover, these
low hourly fees are entirely contingent. While the claimants’ bar does
dedicate a large amount of uncompensated time, no attorney can operate a
practice representing WSI clients without charging the bulk of the fee to the
injured worker.290 The “add-on” fee paid by WSI is almost a de-minimis
benefit at this point. As was argued in Little v. Traynor, the “insufficiency
of fees paid to an employee’s attorney is evidenced by the fact that defense
counsel are paid the same hourly rate, but on a non-contingent basis, with
no fee caps.”291 No doubt egregious low caps on fees preclude many
injured workers from finding legal counsel. Moreover, North Dakota is

286. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-11.1 (2013). The fee cap for all representation through
the hearing is a paltry $5,500.00. See N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-11.1(3)(c) (2013).
287. See Little v. Traynor, 1997 ND 128, ¶ 42, 565 N.W.2d 766, 777.
288. Id. ¶ 24, 565 N.W.2d at 774.
289. Id. ¶ 6, 565 N.W.2d at 775.
290. In Ash v. Traynor, the court held that the attorney may obtain a fee from the client and
bill WSI to reduce the client’s legal bill. 2000 ND 75, ¶ 11, 609 N.W.2d 96, 100. The claimant’s
attorney does not receive a duplicate fee, but simply shifts part of the fee to WSI. Id.
291. 1997 ND 128, ¶ 19, 565 N.W.2d 766, 773.
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probably alone in forbidding use of an attorney’s lien to secure payment.292
Just as unavailability of a mortgage would retard home ownership, the
inability to place a lien on a recovery limits access to legal counsel.
By contrast, WSI brings to bear enormous resources, including claims
adjusters, investigators, legal assistants, in-house counsel, medical
consultants, and outside counsel, against which formidable resources the
claimant’s attorney stands alone. While WSI pays to call its IME expert to
testify, claimants are left to fend for themselves with no resources to call the
claimant’s treating doctor to testify. At one time, when commissioners
heard these cases and the agency was represented by the attorney general,
the treating physician was examined in the vast majority of cases. Now, the
playing field is completely tilted to a defense strategy, which would be fine
if the agency was simply an insurer that appears before an independent
commission charged with the duty to be impartial.
The claimant, moreover, has the burden of proof.293 It is astounding
that WSI has set fee caps so much lower than the statistics show is required
to present an adequate case, which for the hearing is limited to just
$5,500.00.294 According to WSI’s annual reports, the agency paid its own
lawyers well over three times what was paid to claimant’s counsel in 2011
and 2012.295 WSI has paid more money to the Office of Administrative
Hearings for the cost of judges than to claimant’s counsel.296
The question for WSI is whether injured workers should have access to
counsel. From 1919 until the mid-1990’s the value of legal representation
was little questioned. Such inadequacies indicate that WSI acts in an
adversarial position to injured workers, and most individuals denied
benefits absolutely need counsel. WSI’s use of outside counsel and IMEs
illustrates, starkly, this adversarial attitude.
Professor Larson notes that the majority of states provide an “add-on”
fee precisely because benefit levels are not sufficient to provide a living for
the claimant and his or her family. “Once legal representation of the
claimant is recognized to be one of the given facts of present compensation
practice, the legislative treatment of the problem—allowance of fees above
the basic award—would seem to follow as a matter of course.”297
292. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-29 (2013) (stating that except for child support obligations
or claims by Job Service or WSI for repayment, “[a]ny assignment of a claim for compensation
under this title is void.”).
293. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-11 (2013).
294. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-11.1(3)(c) (2013).
295. WORKFORCE SAFETY AND INSURANCE, 2011 AND 2012 WORKFORCE SAFETY AND
INSURANCE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 35 (2012), http://www nd.gov/auditor/reports/WSI_12.pdf.
296. Id.
297. 8 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 133.07.
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Crucially, Professor Larson observes that “some administrators feel
that legal fees unnecessarily cut down the worker’s net recovery, that the
worker would frequently do just as well without the lawyers since the board
will always look after the workers’ interests.”298 However, North Dakota
does not have an independent overseer, such as a commission. Rather,
North Dakota commingles the insurance and oversight function in one
agency. Since WSI now uses outside counsel and IMEs to fight nearly
every contested case, the idea that this agency “will always look after the
workers’ interests” mocks truth and justice.
The Colorado Supreme Court has noted that it could not have been the
legislative intent to allow a fee on “such a low and unreasonable level as
would foreclose a claimant from obtaining competent counsel,” for this may
well deny due process.299 Professor Larson notes that some policy makers
“carry restrictions on fees to the point where they may well injure claimants
as a class both by hindering the growth of an able compensation bar and by
making it economically impossible for claimant’s lawyers to give the
necessary time to the preparation of each case.”300 This is the case now in
North Dakota. The claimants’ bar has been decimated, and the few lawyers
who take any cases are aging.
North Dakota policymakers, legislators, administrators, and courts
must examine workers compensation down to its roots. Among the
essential questions: does WSI think it protects injured workers so they do
not need counsel? What is the evidence? Is this not belied by the
aggressive use of IMEs rather than fairly examining the opinion of the
treating doctor as it once did? Does WSI believe that attorneys are
adequately compensated? Then why are most attorneys unwilling to
represent injured workers? Do attorneys serve a purpose, or is WSI
satisfied with the eventual demise of the claimant’s bar in our state? Should
injured workers have access to legal services? If rates and caps are not
raised, how will access be assured?
Such questions starkly answer themselves. As to IMEs, WSI claims it
does not use them outside of the industry standard.301 But North Dakota
298. Id. at § 133.05 (emphasis added).
299. Cline v. Warrenberg, 126 P.2d 1030, 1031 (Colo. 1942).
300. 8 LARSON, supra note 7, at § 133.07.
301. Sedgwick, who conducted WSI’s 2014 performance evaluation, said in its report issued
that WSI does not use IMEs more often than is the case in other states. N.D. WORKFORCE
SAFETY AND INSURANCE, 2014 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF NORTH DAKOTA WORKFORCE
SAFETY AND INSURANCE 29 (2014), http://www nd.gov/auditor/reports/wsi_pe_14.pdf. What
Sedgwick misses is that while WSI may use IMEs rather rarely out of the universe of all claims
filed, it uses them in nearly every case litigated by a claimant represented by legal counsel. North
Dakota has a low incidence of IMEs only because it has squeezed the life out of the claimants’
bar.
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has much less litigation given the paucity of attorney representation, and
WSI uses an IME in nearly every contested case that involves causation.
Access to counsel simply cannot be improved without significant changes
to reimbursement. As the fees will remain contingent, the unfairness of the
drastic fee caps—so that even winning cases are taken at a loss—is not
sustainable. The fee caps should be at least doubled. Additionally, North
Dakota should consider amending the statutes to provide for an attorney’s
lien—much like the justification for creation of a purchase money security
interest, the claimant would not be enjoying receipt of benefits without the
legal representation.
B. WSI RELIES ON IMES ABOVE TREATING PHYSICIANS
WSI’s adversarial litigation posture is front-and-center in the
proliferation of IMEs. WSI’s use of IMEs in litigation is highlighted in the
2014 performance audit. The auditor said “[i]t is noteworthy that no North
Dakota licensed physician performed any of the examinations in our claim
review sample.”302 WSI apparently made no concerted effort to recruit
North Dakota medical providers to conduct IME’s since 2010.303
According to the audit of the IME process, “[s]eventy-five percent of the
IME decisions in the evaluation group of 75 claims/80 evaluations were
made in favor of WSI. Only 23% of the IME decisions agreed with the
treating physician in the North Dakota sample.”304 Remarkably, in the
other five jurisdictions used for comparison purposes, the IME’s disagreed
with the treating physician only 43% of the time, rather than 75% of the
time, as in North Dakota.305
Just the prior legislative session, two Senators with inside knowledge
of WSI matters, Senator Kilzer and Senator Carlisle,306 introduced a bill to
address WSI’s excessive reliance on independent medical examinations to
deny legitimate claims.307 Section 1 of the bill was intended to strengthen
the “treating doctor statute,”308 which at the time gave “controlling weight”
to the opinions of the employee’s treating doctor over the opinion provided
by a doctor in an IME. It is self-evident that the doctor who treats his or her
patient and sees the results of treatment is better equipped to answer
302. Id. at 9.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 24.
305. Id. at 24-25.
306. Senator Carlisle was a Commissioner at the Bureau in the early 1980s. Senator Kilzer
was a medical consultant at the Bureau in the 1990s.
307. S.B. 2298, 63d. Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).
308. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-08.3 (2009). As ultimately enacted, S.B. 2298 struck this
language from the statute.
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questions about the patient than a one-time IME examiner. So it makes
simple sense that greater weight is due the treating physician than a hiredgun IME.309 In Albright v. North Dakota Workforce Safety & Insurance,310
the court, relying upon legislative history rather than the actual language of
the “treating doctor statute,” held that the purpose of the statute had simply
been to codify existing caselaw that WSI has an obligation to consider the
entire record, clarify inconsistencies, and adequately explain its reasons for
disregarding medical evidence favorable to the claimant. So long as the
ALJ explains why the IME is more persuasive—which claimants’ attorneys
have found can be nearly anything—the opinion of the treating doctor is
easily disregarded.
At one time, WSI relied on IMEs only in unique or complicated cases
and otherwise would elect to examine the treating doctor under oath.311 In
prior years, the Fund had a relationship with the Bismarck Assessment
Team, which was composed of a psychiatrist, a neurologist, an orthopedist,
and a physiatrist, to perform a joint IME. Unlike now, there was little
disagreement between the IME assessment team and the treating doctors.
Once rare, IMEs are now routine for the litigator. There is simply no
reason to avoid listening closely to the treating doctor who knows so much
more about the patient and injury. A treating physician’s opinion all too
briefly summarized in a letter can be explored in very good detail at the
hearing.
In the past, the opinion of the treating doctor given under oath at the
hearing satisfied everyone, even WSI. Many times, the complete and fullbodied opinions of the treating doctor were nuanced to the extent that they
actually favor WSI in substantial ways. In order to recover this essential
input of treating physicians that alone ensures basic fairness of opportunity
and levels the playing field, section 2 of S.B. 2298 would have required
309. According to WSI’s 2008 Performance Evaluation Report, 82% of all of the IMEs were
performed by Minnesota physicians and only 18% by North Dakota physicians. 2008
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 60, at 92. It is also clear that the IME doctors
are paid to render adverse medical opinions. According to WSI’s 2008 Performance Evaluation,
the IME reviewer disagreed with the treating doctor most of the time—65% in frank
disagreement. Id.
310. 2013 ND 97, ¶¶ 21-27, 833 N.W.2d 1, 7-9. The court normally resorts to legislative
history only if the language of the statute is ambiguous. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-39 (2013).
The statute uses the nearly identical wording as the social security regulation, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527 (2012), which provides that the Social Security Administration will generally defer to
the opinion of the treating doctor over that of the consultant. See Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
486 F.3d 234, 242 (6th Cir. 2007).
311. For example, in Satrom v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, the court
reversed the Bureau’s denial of benefits to a hairdresser who alleged her acute disc syndrome was
caused by her repetitive bending, twisting, and turning of the low back based on the testimony of
her treating physician, which the court quoted at length. 328 N.W.2d 824, 825-30 (N.D. 1982).
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WSI to fund the cost of the taking of the claimant’s doctor’s testimony at
hearing, but only if WSI was relying upon an IME examiner to rebut the
claimant’s case.312 Despite the hyperbole about potential financial impact,
this did not preclude WSI from using IMEs and calling the IME examiner
to testify. In fact, because the employee has the burden of proof, the IME
would have the final rebuttal.
The funding provision in the bill would help ensure that our state’s
outstanding treating doctors are honored for the service they perform and
that their professional integrity is not brought into question simply because
they think their patient was hurt at work, requires medical care, and may
need protective work restrictions during recovery. The Legislature altered
the intent of this bill by striking the funding of treating physician opinions
from the legislation, and it ensured that the “treating physician rule” only
requires WSI to set out its reasoning in accepting the opinion of a treating
doctor or the WSI paid IME examiner.313
As noted, Satrom illustrates the previous reliance on treating physicians
to provide the expert testimony. The North Dakota Supreme Court also
considered WSI’s argument that “as the finder of facts, it is not required to
adopt per se the testimony or opinion of any witness,”314 holding that
because North Dakota Century Code chapter 28-32 “requires that the
Bureau’s findings of fact be supported by a preponderance of the evidence,”
there is need for real judicial review whether the decision denying benefits
is based on clear and competent medical evidence in the record.315 The
court explained:
The adversary concept has only limited application to claims for
workmen’s compensation benefits and the Bureau, in carrying out
its statutory duties, acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and should be
primarily concerned with the proper, fair, and just determination of
any claim submitted. Accordingly, it is inappropriate for the
Bureau to rely only upon that part of an inconsistent medical

312. S.B. 2298, as introduced, provided in section two: “Notwithstanding section 65-05-28,
if the organization obtains an independent medical examination or independent medical review,
the employee may call the treating doctor to testify at the administrative hearing at the expense of
the organization.” S.B. 2298, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (introduced version
13.0754.01000),
http://www.legis nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-075401000.pdf?20140912111749.
313. S.B. 2298 amended North Dakota Century Code section 65-05-08.3(1) to provide that a
“presumption may not be established in favor of any doctor’s opinion.” 2013 N.D. Laws 504, § 1.
However, two of the seven factors identified to weigh the competing expert opinions still relate
directly to the treating relationship.
314. Satrom, 328 N.W.2d at 831.
315. Id.
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report which is favorable to the Bureau’s position without
attempting to clarify the inconsistency.316
This review of the ALJ’s findings and the record does not require the
court to re-weigh the facts or substitute its determination for that of the
ALJ. Rather, the court must not abdicate its review function. Reflective
review should recognize that the opinion of an IME or its medical
consultant not supported by the history and evidence of record is not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence and must be rejected in favor
of a fully supported opinion supplied by the treating physician. Moreover,
unless there is clear reason to reject credibility, WSI must not attempt to
sew up the claimant’s case with guess-work credibility determinations.317
C. THE SAME “BUMP RULE” APPLICABLE IN THE DISTRICT COURT
SHOULD APPLY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS SEEKING
COMPENSATION BENEFITS.
Claimants counsel advocate adoption of a bump rule that would allow a
demand for change of the ALJ. While the Office of Administrative
Hearings replied that a bump rule may reduce the diversity of the members
deciding cases, this is no answer in administrative cases. Unlike a
reviewing court on appeal, the ALJ makes all fact-findings and presides
alone. In contrast to many other kinds of hearings over which Office of
Administrative Proceedings presides, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
held that workers’ compensation benefits constitute an important
substantive right under equal protection, because such benefits are for
personal injury and “for which the injured workers give up the right to
sue . . . .”318 Individuals seeking worker’s compensation benefits are often
in dire economic peril, which explains their inability to afford legal counsel.
The critical nature of these benefits to sustain their very life-blood is strong
argument that additional protections are necessary in workers compensation
proceedings compared to other proceedings, such as unemployment and
driving privilege cases.
Perhaps recognizing that the workers’
compensation remedy has already been adulterated to the extent the court
has questioned whether those benefits provide the “sure and certain relief”
required by the Act.319 The problem is compounded by the huge disparity
in resources and an unnecessarily adversarial system.
316. Id. at 831-32 (quoting Roberts v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 326 N.W.2d 702,
706 (N.D. 1982)).
317. Id. at 832 (citing Inglis v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 312 N.W.2d 318, 323 (N.D.
1981)).
318. Lee v. Job Service North Dakota, 440 N.W.2d 518, 519 (N.D. 1989).
319. Baldock v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 441, 446 n.4 (N.D. 1996).
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As previously noted, to most injured workers, the most disturbing
aspect of administrative law is that there is no right to a trial by his peers;
this frustration is compounded by understanding the power of the ALJ to
alone decide her fate, with no right to demand a change of judge, as would
be available in the district court.320 “Scholars and judges consistently
characterize provision of a neutral decision maker as one of . . . core
requirements of a system of fair adjudicatory decision making.”321
Regarding this most crucial factor to afford due process—an impartial
decision-maker—North Dakota’s APA allows a party to seek
disqualification of an ALJ if there is good cause, which is interpreted as
showing actual bias.322
On its surface, the procedural safeguards in the APA ensure the right to
due process of law. But, if the decision-maker is shown statistically more
prone to judge cases in favor of a certain party, the procedural safeguards
become immaterial. Of course, the only time the injured worker has an
opportunity to present evidence is at the administrative hearing, as the
reviewing court does not take additional evidence or review the record de
novo. Instead, the courts simply review the administrative tribunal’s
findings to determine if there is evidence in the record to support the
findings.323 A party appealing an agency’s factual determinations will find
that the determinations are not easily reversed, because in reviewing the
agency’s findings of fact, the court does not make independent findings or
substitute its judgment for the ALJs.324 The bar is a low one: “whether a
reasoning mind reasonably could have determined the findings were proven
by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.”325

320. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21 (2013) (allowing a party to demand a change of
judge of the district court). This right had been enshrined in North Dakota law since 1877. See
Traynor v. Leclerc, 1997 ND 47, ¶ 9, 561 N.W.2d 644, 648.
321. II PIERCE, supra note 148, at § 9.8.
322. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-27 (2013). While North Dakota’s APA allows a party to
challenge the ALJ for good cause, proving actual bias is a heavy burden and presents serious
practical considerations. Bias is typically thought to consist of: (1) prejudgment of issues in
controversy; (2) personal prejudice toward a party; (3) conflict of interest and ex parte
communications; and (4) appearance of impropriety. Personal bias or prejudice for or against a
party will almost always require disqualification. Personal bias, sometimes referred to as actual
bias, is an attitude toward a person, as distinguished from an attitude about an issue. KENNETH
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 19:5, at 389-92. A clear case of personal bias is rarely
established, precisely because decision-makers simply do not make statements expressing either
preference for or distaste against a party: almost no-one makes the blatant mistake of admitting
impartiality. Rather, personal bias can only be revealed by repeated and consistent rulings made
by a hearing examiner in favor of one side; this should constitute grounds for disqualification. Id.
323. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-46 (2013).
324. Workforce Safety & Ins. v. Auck, 2010 ND 126, ¶ 9, 785 N.W.2d 186, 190.
325. Id.
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In the midst of the explosion of cases determined in administrative
proceedings and the tremendous deference given to agency decisions, a
party’s due process rights to a fair and impartial tribunal loom critical. The
administrative code should be amended to provide for disqualification of
ALJs on the same grounds as available to demand a change of district court
judge. If a duly elected district judge, whose only duty in an administrative
case is to conduct judicial review, can be disqualified upon demand, justice
and common sense demands that the right to disqualify an ALJ also be
provided on demand. After all, the rights affected in an administrative
hearing are as significant as the rights decided in the courts.
As noted, the APA limits the right to demand a change of ALJ to good
cause.326 Nothing in the APA, however, limits the authority of the Office of
Administrative Hearings to set a higher standard and allow a party an
unfettered right to demand a change in the administrative law judge on the
same terms as may be had in the district court.327 The 1981 Model APA
allows disqualification of a presiding officer for the same causes for which
a judge can be disqualified.328 Requiring proof of actual bias places too
high a burden on the challenger.
Initiated Measure No. 4 (approved Nov. 4, 2008), made the findings of
an Independent Administrative Law Judge in Workforce Safety and
Insurance matters final, subject only to appeal by WSI.329 Incorporating the
requirements of the measure, North Dakota Century Code section 65-0222.1 provides that the Office of Administrative Hearings shall issue the
final findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. Consequently, it is
apparent that Office of Administrative Hearings has ample authority to
promulgate a rule authorizing change of the ALJ in WSI matters on the
same terms as demand for change of judge in the district court.
D. IT IS TIME TO CONSIDER ALLOWING PRIVATE INSURANCE
Clearly, reform is desperately needed. Coverage and benefits should
be expanded, not continually retracted. Oddly—at least for a truly
independent agency without its hands on the scale—WSI’s legislative
initiatives are nearly always to reduce coverage or benefits, rarely to expand
them. Rather than extend coverage or improve benefits, WSI has refunded
to employers over $774 million since 2005.330
Perhaps political

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-27(2) (2013).
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21 (2013).
MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 4-202(c) (1981).
See Auck, ¶ 4, 785 N.W.2d at 188.
See Forum News Service, supra note 4.
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accountability will be improved if the Legislature allows private insurance
to compete for premium dollars and separates WSI’s regulatory and
insurance functions. For if WSI is simply one of the insurers, rather than
also serving as the regulator, perhaps its influence in the Legislature will be
reduced. Make no mistake, WSI lobbies hard, session after session, for
benefit and coverage limitations. And, as noted, WSI has taken an
aggressive litigation posture relying on IMEs and outside counsel with little
or no institutional knowledge and the simple goal to win. A neutral
regulator is more likely to consider basic workers’ compensation principles
in its lobbying, rather than relying predominantly on cost considerations.
North Dakota is one of the few states that commingle the insurance and
regulatory functions.
The splitting of WSI into two entities has been needed for some time.
Moreover, the Legislature should reinstate political accountability in the
state’s elected officials331 by eliminating the part-time board that controlled
WSI from 1997 until the people of our state voted to vest control of WSI in
the Governor in 2008.332 While the Governor appoints the Director, the
part-time board continues to determine WSI’s legislative initiatives.333
Clearly, a full time director and staff can persuade part-time board members
to recommend any policy they choose to advocate.334 The Governor, rather
than this part-time board that advocates for WSI staff, should assert this
direct control over legislative initiatives. This is especially important in a
state in which the lobbying insurance regulator is also the insurance
company that pays the claims. The very nature of an insurer is to advocate
policies that reduce payments, or increase revenue.
Only North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming continue to have
a monopolist system where the state is the sole provider of workers’

331. Perhaps the surmise that political accountability would result in a more balanced
approach between favoring employers versus employees interests has been proven incorrect over
time.
332. North Dakota Century Code section 65-02-01.3 implements the people’s approval of
Initiated Measure No. 4, providing that the governor must appoint WSI’s director. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 65-01-01.3 (2013). WSI opposed the measure. Moreover, in December 2007, it was
discovered that WSI had paid private investigators $774 to put Jean Wanner, the primary sponsor
of this ballot initiative, under surveillance. See Dale Wetzel, Leader of WSI initiative followed by
investigators, BISMARCK TRIBUNE, Dec. 14, 2007, http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-andregional/leader-of-wsi-initiative-followed-by-investigators/article_9309c5cb-861e-51fe-8bc52cf8259375d2 html.
333. The duties of the board include providing “formal recommendations to the governor
regarding legislation that affect the organization.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-02-03.3(5) (2013).
334. See generally WORKFORCE SAFETY & INSURANCE, 2013 WORKFORCE SAFETY &
INSURANCE
(WSI)
LEGISLATIVE
QUICK
GUIDE
(2013),
http://www.workforcesafety.com/library/documents/other/LegislativeGuide2013.pdf.
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compensation insurance.335 The current reform method of choice is toward
privatization and open competitive markets.
In an open market
environment, competition determines pricing. Nevada converted from a
monopolistic state fund to allow competition in 1999.336 The 2003
Legislature rejected a bill that would have allowed private workers’
compensation insurance in North Dakota.337 The bill did not address the
need to create an oversight agency for all insurers, including the State Fund.
Allowing other carriers to compete for business is an alluring idea; basic
economic theory suggests that competition improves efficiency. However,
the renowned workers’ compensation author John Burton indicates that
while deregulation of insurance with real competition among insurers for
business may reduce costs, the data is not clear-cut.338 Nevertheless,
allowing private insurance will not only provide competition, but also
require the Legislature to vest the oversight function in a neutral regulator
that does not also benefit from its decisions to deny payment.
Whether or not the Legislature eventually elects to allow private
insurance, it is time for the Legislature to untangle WSI’s insurance
function from its oversight function and create a separate politically
accountable state agency as regulator to oversee the insurer, WSI. The
benefit to be derived from this conversion is substantial justice and political
accountability and is in conformity with recommendations of the 1972
National Commission.339 Put it this way: who among us would be satisfied
if the insurance company we were fighting with to receive compensation for
an automobile accident not only wrote the policy, but also controlled the
evidentiary hearing. And this problem is only compounded when that
insurer has predominance in the Legislature to advocate coverage
exclusions and benefit limitations. In essence, that is North Dakota’s
workers’ compensation system as it exists now.
VI. CONCLUSION
The workers’ compensation bargain presupposes the equality of
employers and workers. But employers control the workplace and have
primary responsibility for safety. Injured employees find that the promise

335. Help Protect Your Business and Employees with Workers Compensation Insurance,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, https://www.statefarm.com/smallbusiness-solutions/insurance/employee-benefits-coverage/workers-compensation.
336. S.B. 37, 70th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1999).
337. H. JOURNAL, 58th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 389 (N.D. 2003).
338. See generally JOHN F. BURTON ET AL., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COSTS,
AND SAFETY UNDER ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS (2001).
339. Haas, supra note 18, at 272-81.
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of sure and certain relief is often illusory, as coverage and benefits are
rolled back. Claimants have little access to legal services. North Dakota’s
legislative reforms and court cases have shown a clear trend to provide the
benefits of the bargain to employers, immunizing them from suit while
employees receive lesser coverage of injury and increasingly harder rules to
get and keep benefits. This has allowed employers to escape legal
responsibility for accidents and provides a license to ignore moral
obligations by viewing injury as inevitable. Injured employees often
remark that they have not only lost the ability to earn a living, but feel
devalued by the system. As the North Dakota Supreme Court said, the
burden of noncoverage “still rests entirely upon the injured . . . if not
economically, surely in the loss of dignity.”340 The Act contains high ideals
and lofty prose, boldly declaring that “the prosperity of the state depends in
a large measure upon the well-being of its wageworkers” and promises both
the injured and their dependents “sure and certain relief.”341 It is time to
restore what has been lost in the post-1995 reforms.
The Legislature has, session after session, listened to WSI whisper that
nothing is wrong that a bit more tightening cannot fix. If WSI will not sign
on to any of these concrete steps to address coverage and benefits, such as
improving access to counsel and reducing reliance on IMEs over treating
physicians, perhaps we have to wait for the wheels of justice to simply
break under the strain as catalyst to action to bring the Act back into
balance. If that occurs, the demand will be to allow free market principles
to operate and permit other insurance companies to write policies with
creation of an independent entity to perform the oversight function. The
status quo is not working, and the eyes of the nation are upon us.

340. Benson v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96, 107 (N.D. 1979).
341. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (2013). The Act, adopted in 1919, “exhibited a socialist
bent,” as progressives also created the State Mill and Elevator and State Bank. See Anderson and
Deloss, supra note 38, at 352.

